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ABSTRACT
Law will determine the future of the planet. Net metering, the regulatory
mechanism employed by 88% of U.S. states to promote renewable power
and to reduce carbon emissions from electricity production, is now legally
challenged. The legality of recent carbon control policies is expected to
head to the Supreme Court.
The law governing electric power, and electric power itself, is distinct
from everything else. The physics of electricity do not align with the law.
Electric power, alone among all forms of energy, is the only energy which
cannot be stored: The supply of power produced must instantaneously
second-by-second exactly match the demand for power, or the power grid
collapses as it did in the eastern U.S. in 2003. Rapidly expanding use of
intermittent net metered solar and wind sources pose a new concern for
the maintenance of a reliable and stable power grid.
Well-established precedent requires equitable and precise allocation of
the costs of every power transaction. Without states undertaking this cost
analysis and setting rates, there is a missing legal link. Only two of the
forty-four states that employ net metering of renewable power have done
this analysis. Without doing so, the other forty-two states leave their
primary climate change policies and renewable energy incentives vulnerable
to challenge and reversal as soon as those states enact them.
This Article examines the legal and physical differences between
electricity and everything else that the law addresses. This Article navigates

222

FERREY (DO NOT DELETE)

10/17/2018 1:16 PM

Net Legal Power

[VOL. 53: 221, 2016]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the legal “trip wires” around power, dissecting the disparate renewable
power net metering policies in 41 states. We “follow the money” to examine
who directly benefits and who indirectly pays for net metering, as a
matter of law, and how this affects this cutting edge of government policy.
States are now challenged on their net metering policies.
Legal vulnerabilities in major policies require solutions: States can,
but most haven’t yet taken the steps to, immunize their renewable energy
programs against legal challenge. This is critical to meaningfully address
climate change. This Article’s final sections map a legal solution and
chart the missing legal link.
I. “THIS SIDE UP”
To effectively arrest rapid world climate change, the U.S. must quickly
mitigate carbon emissions from electric power that contribute to runaway
global warming.1 Net metering, the principal regulatory mechanism
employed in the U.S. to promote renewable power to reduce carbon
emissions from electricity,2 now is challenged as inefficient and inequitable3
in subsidizing the use of power by the most affluent.4 With regulation of
carbon emissions now stayed by the Supreme Court and the challenge
expected to arrive again at the Supreme Court,5 the law must determine
which side is up.

1. Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
ghgemissions/gases/co2.html [https://perma.cc/RE87-QS24] (last visited May 30, 2016).
2. Net metering is provided in forty-four U.S. states, which is 88% of all states,
and is thus the most widespread and robust renewable incentive in any country in the
world.
3. See infra Section V.
4. See infra Section VI.A.
5. See infra Section IV.A.2 for a discussion of the administration’s Clean Power
Plan. Jocelyn Durkay, Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering
policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx [https://perma.cc/8MUS-EST7] (last
updated Dec. 18, 2014).
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Globally, the U.S. and 191 other world governments that signed the
Kyoto Protocol6 have arrived at a critical “tipping point.”7 The United
Nations forecast a coming “tipping point[] . . . that will alter regional and
global environmental balances . . . irreversib[ly] within the time span of
our current civilization.”8 According to Dr. John Holdren, Director of the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, if U.S. greenhouse
emissions somehow plateaued in 2015, we would already have reduced
by 50% our chance of any policy avoiding climate catastrophes.9 And
global greenhouse emissions increased in 2015, rather than plateauing or
receding.
Whether or not the world “tips” is linked to electric power: “The electric
power sector offers the most cost-effective opportunities to reduce CO2
emissions,” compared to transportation and all other sectors.10 Before
tipping into Dr. Holdren’s precipice, two of the three primary mechanisms
for a transition to renewable power—renewable portfolio standards and
feed-in tariffs—have been successfully challenged in the form adopted by
several U.S. states as unconstitutional pursuant to, respectively, the
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.11 This leaves
one mechanism, net metering, as the predominant legal tool to transition

6. The United States signed, but never ratified the Kyoto Protocol. In 2012,
Canada, Russia, New Zealand, and Japan either withdrew or ceased being bound in the
current phase of the Protocol. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/Kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/
items/2613.php [https://perma.cc/F6AH-TEGZ] (last visited May 30, 2016); Associated
Press, U.N. Climate Conference Adopts Kyoto Extension, CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2012, 3:16
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-climate-conference-adopts-kyoto-extension [https://
perma.cc/2DYA-KSKR]. As of November 2015, New Zealand accepted the Doha Amendment
to the Kyoto Protocol. Doha Amendment of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. TREATIES COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter
=27&lang=en [https://perma.cc/S9BE-GZ72] (last visited May 30, 2016).
7. Dean Scott, NASA Scientist Recalls 1988 Testimony by Seeking Phaseout of
Coal-Fired Plants, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1273 (June 27, 2008).
8. New Science and Development in Our Changing Environment, 2009 U.N.
ENV’T PROGRAMME Y.B. 21, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.25/INF/2, http://www.unep.org/yearbook/
2009 [https://perma.cc/JVL9-L7DX].
9. Robin Chase, Get Real on Global Warming Goals, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 22, 2008,
at A15.
10. Energy Estimates Show Rise in CO2 Emissions, Offer Mitigation Options, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, July 2, 2008, LEXIS.
11. See Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon
Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
125, 127 (2010); Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL
GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 86–89, 98 (2012); Steven Ferrey, The Double Helix of Supremacy
and Commerce Clause Constitutional Restraints Encircling the New Energy Frontier, 7
NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2014).
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to renewable energy in the United States. Net metering also is the fastest
increasing policy tool used to promote world renewable energy.12
However, net metering is now under significant pressure in several of
the 88% of U.S. states which deploy it, as an imprecise legal mechanism
and a failure of legal regulators to calculate a proper rate determination.13
The climate stakes are significant because net metering is the key U.S.
policy to urgently address climate change.14 With challenges to other U.S.
policies on climate change now heading toward the Supreme Court,15 we
examine the net metering tension.
This Article sets forth the law and reveals that among the forty-four
U.S. states implementing energy net metering, see Figure 1, only two state
energy regulatory commissions have done the required analysis to establish a
legally supportable tariff for net metering. Without undertaking this analysis,
a missing legal link leaves this primary policy vulnerable to challenge.
FIGURE 1: STATE NET METERING POLICY

Source: http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/Net_Metering1.pdf.

12. See infra Section II.A.
13. See infra Section VI.A.
14. STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX 236–39 (2010).
15. See Steven Ferrey, Presidential Executive Action: Unilaterally Changing the
World’s Critical Technology and Infrastructure, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 43, 67–76 (2016)
(discussing the Clean Power Plan promulgated through executive action, now being
challenged, and in 2016 temporarily stayed by the U.S. Supreme Court).
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This Article charts what is missing to legally protect net metering policy
to address climate change and global warming. Section II dissects very
different net metering policy in forty-four states and proceeds to navigate
across sensitive legal ‘trip wires’ which could impair these mechanisms.
Section II examines the stakeholders, the roles they play, and their benefits
from the net metering system at the core of renewable energy and climate
change policy in the United States. This Article also focuses on the most
legally advanced state net metering system, the exodus of net metering
customers from contributing to operation of the electric grid, and the
mounting impacts for those who remain behind.
Section III dives from regulatory policy into the subatomic level, analyzing
how the physics of electricity in the United States align and misalign with
the law. Electric power, alone among all forms of energy on the planet,
is the only one that cannot be stored: Supply of power must instantaneously
second-by-second exactly match the demand for power or the power grid
collapses as it did in the Eastern United States in 2003.16 Rapidly expanding
intermittent renewable energy sources, like solar power and wind power,
pose new legal and financial challenges to the maintenance of a reliable
power grid.17 There are significant additional costs and environmental
externalities which states now must confront.18
Precedent matters. Section IV analyzes in detail the law and precedent
applied to American power, which require equitable and precise allocation
of the costs of every power transaction. Section IV analyzes often overlooked
decisions which could constrain net metering of renewable power until
states do what they have consciously omitted. Only two states have made
this effort to date, which the Article examines.
Section V “follows the money”19 to examine who benefits and who pays
for net metering. The legal and financial issue is examined from different
stakeholder perspectives. Section V examines three different utilities and
their proposals in the most solar states, and who wins and loses in a zerosum power calculation.
Legal vulnerabilities require solutions. Section VI applies the often ignored
precedent to design legally “bullet-proof” state policies to address climate
change and renewable energy. This must be done as we teeter on the edge
of the global warming “tipping point.”
This Article starts by examining the “what” and “how” of net metering,
which is the major U.S. policy to address climate change and transition to
renewable power.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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II. NETTING THE WHOLE POWER
A. Who Nets What?
The most used state subsidy for renewable power and for combatting
climate change is net metering20 used in forty-four States:21




85% of the states have enacted net metering at the state
level;
65% of the states have implemented renewable portfolio
standards; and
33% of the states have adopted renewable System Benefit
Charges/trust funds.22

Net metering is a policy that allows retail electricity customers to receive
credits on their utility bills for on-site renewable energy generation exported
to the state’s electric grid in excess of their electric load.23 During times
when energy is not being used by the customer but its renewable energy
system is producing electricity, the net meter spins in reverse direction
registering exported electricity to the utility.24 Customers are given credit
by the utility for every kilowatt-hour of electricity not used by the customer
but exported to the utility.25 By turning the meter backwards, and because
only a single rate applies to a single meter, net metering effectively
compensates the generator at, or near, the full retail rate, which includes
approximately 60% of the retail bill attributable to transmission, distribution,
and taxes, for transferring just the wholesale energy commodity—the power

20. See Net Metering, DSIRE (Feb. 2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Net_Metering_022016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCW7-YWQW].
21. STEVEN WEISSMAN & NATHANIEL JOHNSON, U.C. BERKELEY CTR. L. ENERGY &
ENV’T, THE STATEWIDE BENEFITS OF NET-METERING IN CALIFORNIA AND THE CONSEQUENCES
OF CHANGES TO THE PROGRAM 2 (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp
content/uploads/2015/06/The_Statewide_Benefits_of_Net-Metering_in_CA_Weissman_
and_Johnson3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N52R-NQQS].
22. See Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle
Surrounding State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 122 (2014)
(citing E LIZABETH D ORIS ET AL ., S TATE OF THE S TATES 2009: R ENEWABLE ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 65 (2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/
46667.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE9A-39HZ]).
23. See Net Metering, NAT’L GRID (2016), https://www.nationalgridus.com/masselectric/
business/energyeff/4_net-mtr.asp.
24. See id.
25. See id.
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itself.26 The value received for that net metered power is an amount above
the utility’s avoided cost27 or the wholesale rate set by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) or by independent system operators (ISOs)
who manage the utility grids for more than half of consumers.
The net metered customer enjoys a free energy banking service and
does not compensate the utility for using the grid to effectuate this energy
banking, or for distribution investments made by the utility. The net metering
customer uses the distribution grid twice, sending and later receiving power,
and is never charged for either usage of the grid. Such free services are
wholly divorced from rate making principles. For this transfer of their
power to the grid, net metering customers pay no transmission or distribution
charges even though they are using the distribution system. Net metering
is an accounting convention applied to trading power that technically does
not include a power sale according to case decisions.28
The utilities credit and/or pay the net metering customer for the kilowatthours at a bundled retail rate, even though the utility could buy power
elsewhere at a dramatically cheaper wholesale rate.29 Therefore, the utility,
and ultimately its customers who incur the pass-through of all of these
charges, is actually paying more—often triple or quadruple the price—for
the net-metered power than it is paying for power produced elsewhere in
the market. For example, the Author’s current retail rate in Boston is an
average cost of $0.21/kWh, and a net metered customer would be credited
at near this retail rate; wholesale power in the New England region, and
in most other areas of the country, for the past five years has been selling
for approximately $0.045 or less.30
Moreover, the utility has to accept and credit or pay for this power
whenever the distributed generation produces it, rather than when the utility
26. See Glossary, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/support/glossary/ [https://perma.cc/
3H9T-223C] (last visited May 30, 2016) (“In effect, the customer uses excess generation
to offset electricity that the customer otherwise would have to purchase at the utility’s full
retail rate.”). As to whether electricity is a “good” or a “service” and how it should be
treated under the law, see STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET
REGULATION 211–31 (2000).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-2 (2012).
28. Steven Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law: Power Navigates the Supremacy
Clause, 24 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 267, 273 (2012) (citing DSIRE, www.dsire.org);
see also Glossary, supra note 26 (providing a definition of “net metering”); Net Metering,
SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/distributed-solar/net-metering
[https://perma.cc/59KL-6MPV] (last visited May 30, 2016).
29. For example, the author’s retail, or net metering, rate is $0.24/kWh, although
abundant wholesale power is available for approximately $0.05/kWh.
30. See Real Time Maps and Charts, INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR NEW ENGLAND,
http://www.iso-ne.com/isoexpress/ [https://perma.cc/FG93-VH8Q] (last visited May 30,
2016); Wholesale Electricity and Natural Gas Market Data, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May
26, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/wholesale/ [https://perma.cc/B9V2-7QAX].
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needs power to distribute to its customers. There is no advance notice
required from the net metered customer as to when this power transfer of
renewable energy will occur or for what duration, from intermittent power
generation.
Massachusetts is an order of magnitude more advanced on net metering
compared to any of the other forty-two states which employ he practice.
Massachusetts has “virtual net metering” that is more far-reaching than
the other states because net metering credits can be transferred to other
customers in the utility service territory.31 In Massachusetts, net metering
participants are defined as producers belonging to one of three classes
based on type, size, and ownership of the renewable energy generating
facility, and they receive different credit amounts for their net metered
power. The distribution utilities are allowed to recapture any lost revenues
from net metering from all other retail customers.
In 2008, the Green Communities Act expanded the Massachusetts net
metering program.32 Originally capped at a size of 60 kW per system in
the 1980s, Massachusetts utility customers can now net meter up to 2 MW
on any parcel of land.33 The net metering credits now earn a value close
to the retail power rate. Net metering customers can transfer or sell their
net metering credits to any other customer of the utility in the same load
zone.34 Since 2008, Massachusetts implemented a series of net metering
cap increases35 until 4% of each utility’s overall peak electricity load is
reserved for private net metering credit off-takers and 5% is reserved for
public net metering off-takers, for a total of 9% of peak load which is
already fully net metered.36

31. 220 MASS. CODE REGS. § 18.00 (2015).
32. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164 (West 2008).
33. See id. at § 138.
34. See History of Solar in Massachusetts, MASSSOLAR, http://www.solarisworking.
org/history [https://perma.cc/73VK-XMUM] (last visited May 30, 2016).
35. See Green Communities Act?, MASS.’ BUS. FOR CLEAN ENERGY, http://www.
mabizforcleanenergy.com/ma-supports-clean-energy/green-communities-act [https://perma.
cc/C45A-DX7U] (last visited May 30, 2016).
36. See Massachusetts Net Metering, EVERSOURCE, https://www.eversource.com/
Content/nh/about/doing-business-with-us/builders-contractors/interconnections/massachusetts
-net-metering (last visited May 30, 2016).
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The limits on net metered system size range from 10 kW in Indiana, to
80 MW in New Mexico,37 and there is no limit in Arizona and Ohio.38 In
California, the maximum generation capacity is 1 MW, and the credits
generated by a consumer or group of consumers electing to net meter are
reverted back to the utility at the end of each year if they are not used.39
In New York, there is a 2 MW cap on generation eligible for net metering,
but this limit only applies to non-residential solar or wind projects, and
residential solar and wind generators must stay below a 25 kW maximum.40
So while every state is different in the detail of its program, forty-four
states have in common the most used primary tool for renewable energy
and addressing climate change in the U.S.: Net metering.
B. Net Exodus?
Federal law has encouraged net metering. The Energy Policy Act of
2005 (EPACT) encouraged the widespread adoption of net metering policies
at the state level.41 Under EPACT, state regulatory commissions and electric
utilities were required to consider making net metering services available to
retail electricity consumers upon request.42 Forty-four states and the District
of Columbia have some form of net metering policy, while six states—
Alabama, Idaho, Mississippi, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas—do
not have net metering.43 The growth has been palpable. As of 2003, there
were approximately 7,000 net metering electricity customers out of a total
of more than 100 million customers in the United States,44 and in 2010, the

37. IREC and Vote Solar Release 2015 Freeing the Grid, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE
ENERGY COUNCIL (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.irecusa.org/2016/01/irec-and-vote-solar
release-2015-freeing-the-grid/ [https://perma.cc/Y74G-4836]; Indiana, FREEING THE GRID,
http://www.freeingthegrid.org/#state-grades/Indiana [https://perma.cc/C52C-XPR3] (last
visited May 30, 2016); New Mexico, FREEING THE GRID, http://freeingthegrid.org/#states
grades/new-mexico [https://perma.cc/68HX-DL6D] (last visited May 30, 2016).
38. Arizona, FREEING THE GRID, http://freeingthegrid.org/#state-grades/Arizona
[https://perma.cc/P6BB-8SJG] (last visited May 30, 2016); Ohio, F REEING THE GRID
(2015), http://freeingthegrid.org/#states-grades/ohio [https://perma.cc/F29V-NVC5] (last
visited May 30, 2016).
39. California, FREEING THE GRID, http://freeingthegrid.org/#states-grades/california
[https://perma.cc/6YWM-ZT7B] (last visited June 1, 2016).
40. New York, FREEING THE GRID, http://freeingthegrid.org/#states-grades/new-york
[https://perma.cc/DD99-3Z3R] (last visited June 1, 2016).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(11) (2012).
42. Id.
43. See Durkay, supra note 5. Alabama, Idaho, Mississippi, South Dakota, Tennessee
and Texas are the only states without a state net metering program. Id.
44. Participation in Electric Net-Metering Programs Increased Sharply in Recent
Years, Today in Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 15, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6270 [https://perma.cc/NV4F-EDZS].
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number had increased twenty-fold to 150,000.45 Notwithstanding this expansion,
net metering customers still comprise a small fraction of less than one
percent of all energy consumers.46
The relationship of both the 1% and the other 99% are important as we
make this evolution. Do net metering customers exit the grid and become
self-generating islands unto themselves? No. They typically only generate
some of their energy requirements, and still rely on the grid for a significant
portion and timing of their power, which can still be the majority of their
energy requirements.47 However, the economics are evolving: In the future,
it could become cost-effective to self-generate with solar PV power. Grid
exodus could become a viable option for residential system owners in
Hawaii before 2020, in California in the early 2020s, and in New York
State in the late 2020s. More southern latitudes could begin to achieve
attractive internal rates of return from self-generation around 2020.48
But until then, net metering customers depend on the grid in the same
critical manner as do conventional customers, and do so in a bilateral
direction.49 When the customer demands more electricity than their generator
produces—for example, on a cloudy, humid, summer day when the air
conditioner is running but the sun is not shining—the meter runs forward.50
When the customer generates more electricity than they demand, the meter
runs backwards.51 It is still very much a bidirectional transaction on a
real-time basis.

45. Id.
46. Id. As of 2010, net metering customers represented only 0.1% of all energy
customers in the United States. Id.
47. See Net Metering 101, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.
instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/net-metering-101 [https://perma.cc/5SN6-LVTB].
48. William Rickerson, et al., Residential Prosumers – Drivers and Policy Options
(Re-Prosumers), INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 18 (Sept. 2014), http://iea-retd.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/09/RE-PROSUMERS_IEA-RETD_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NC9-5VFG]
(citing Patrick Hummel, et. al., The Unsubsidised Solar Revolution, UBS INV. RESEARCH
3 (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.qualenergia.it/sites/default/files/articolo-doc/UBS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5JJ8-Y5DL]).
49. Ferrey, supra note 28, at 273.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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III. A NET METERING CHALLENGE TO ELECTRIC
SYSTEM OPERATIONS
A. The Intangibility of Power
Electric power has a delivered value in the U.S. of approximately $390
billion annually,52 exceeding the total amount of corporate income taxes
collected in the U.S.53
The high-voltage transmission network was recognized by engineers as
the most important engineering feat of the 20 century.54 In terms of
physical assets, the “grid” is composed not only of the approximately
4,800 interconnected power generation resources in the United States, but
also of the cable to connect them with consumers, and the hardware to
manage them in an energized instantaneous network.55 The high-voltage
transmission network at 230 kV and higher, comprises 167,000 miles of
line in America.56 In the United States there is an eastern interconnection,
a western interconnection, and a separate interconnection that includes
most of Texas.57 The transmission system operates at fifteen different
voltage levels,58 with limited power transactions between these three
major interconnections.
The electromagnetic force that is electricity is one of the four known
primary forces in the universe. The so-called weak force and the
52. See Electric Power Annual Table 2.3 in U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC
P OWER A NNUAL 2014 (Feb. 16, 2016), http://eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E4Z8-CHXU]. The average delivered price of all electricity nationwide
in 2011 was $0.0966/kWh, and $0.1109/kWh for residential customers. See Average
Retail Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector, by State, Year-toDate through February 2011 and 2010, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF N.Y. STATE, INC.,
http://ppinys.org/reports/jtf/2011/employ/average-retail-price-of-electricity2010-11.htm
[https://perma.cc/9LLS-L3G2] (last visited June 1, 2016).
53. Historical Amount of Revenue by Source, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=203 [https://perma.cc/CBL6
GL2A].
54. Mason Willrich, Electricity Transmission Policy for America: Enabling a
Smart Grid, End to End 5 (MIT-IPC-Energy Innovation Working Paper 09-003),
https://ipc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/EIP_09-003.pdf https://perma.cc/GZ2G
DW9J].
55. Energy Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/
index.cfm?id=e#electr_pow_grid [https://perma.cc/6BSM-TDVA] (last visited June 1,
2016) (defining electric power grid).
56. S TAN M ARK K APLAN , C ONG . R ESEARCH S ERV ., R40511, E LECTRIC POWER
TRANSMISSION: BACKGROUND AND P OLICY I SSUES 1–5 & n.3 (Apr. 14, 2009), http://fpc.
state.gov/documents/organization/122949.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCN2-H646] (discussing
miles of transmission lines).
57. Id. at 3 & fig.2 (providing visual display of interconnections).
58. Craig Cano, Efficiency Should Be Viewed as Key Part of Entire Delivery
System, Wellinghoff Says, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Dec. 13, 2010, at 18–19.
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electromagnetic force are united in quantum field theory, and both are
associated with ripples in the fabric of space-time.59 Electric circuits are
the physical means for conveying energy in a force field to different
places, but always within the line or attachments to it .60 Current is the
rate of flow of electric charge from one place to another.61 As the charged
particles move within a circuit, electrical potential energy is transferred
from a source to a device in which that energy is stored or converted into
another form or work.62
Electricity is identical in every state at every moment: An energy field
transmitted as alternating current at 60 Hz/cycles per second.63 What is
delivered and sold is electric potential, an electric field. While its voltage
is transformed on different lines, its critical status and movement are
constant in every state, in every transaction, and at every moment.
Reliable electricity supply requires a constant, second-by-second
simultaneous balancing of power generation supply to meet demand on
the utility grid.64 The U.S. electric grid will collapse within approximately
four seconds if sufficient generation of power is not constantly supplied
to meet fluctuating consumer demand.65 Either too much or too little
power causes system instability, and a loss of power would disrupt

59. BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS,
AND THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY 197 (1999).
60. HUGH D. YOUNG & ROGER A. FREEDMAN, UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 799 (9th ed. 1996).
61. Id. We measure electricity as energy transferred per unit time. The usual unit
of energy is the kilowatt hour (kWh), which is a kilowatt for an hour. One kilowatt is
1,000 watts per second. A watt is a joule per second. So a kilowatt hour is 3,600,000
joules. One kWh is 1,000 watts for an hour.
62. Id. When a conductor, such as copper or aluminum wire, is not energized by a
generator and is at rest, negatively charged electrons in the copper atoms are free to move
randomly in all directions thermally in the conductor, in close orbit around their nuclei,
similar to molecules in a gas moving in random motion. Because the motion of the
electrons is random, there is not a net flow of charge in any direction inside the copper
wire. When an electric field is applied to the copper wire by a power generation facility;
the circuit is energized with controlled moving charges becoming current in a wire. Id. at
800.
63. See World Electricity Standards, EMR LABS, LLC, http://www.quantumbalancing.
com/worldelectricity/electricityif.htm [https://perma.cc/Z5FC-VW6A] (last visited June
1, 2016). The electricity in the world is transmitted via alternating current, where the
current changes direction of flow either fifty or sixty times per second. Id.
64. See Andrew Howe, Demanding Times, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Sept. 19, 2008, at
20 (discussing challenges of balancing supply and demand within energy grid).
65. See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 568
(6th ed. 2013).
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communication, transportation, heating and water supplies, hospitals, and
emergency rooms.66
According to Kirchoff’s Law,67 power moves almost at the speed of
light on an energized grid.68 If power supply does not constantly balance
instantaneous demand, the grid can blackout large areas,69 as happened to
the northeast U.S. population on August 14, 2003,70 and subsequently
with rolling blackouts in Texas.71 The 2003 blackout affected fifty million
people and caused a loss of six billion dollars.72 During this blackout,
production was lost at approximately half of the Chrysler plants, a Ford
plant was lost for a week of repairs, oil refineries shut down, one chain of
237 drugstores in New York City was forced to close, major urban airports
closed causing more than one thousand flights to be cancelled, and frozen
and perishable foods were lost.73
Electricity is different than everything else in commerce because it is
not a traditional commodity, but a moving electromagnetic field. Differences
matter in law and economics: If we cannot store electricity, we invent
legal fictions as part of a model which suggests that electricity is more
matter than its reality as intangible energy. Moreover, if renewable distributed

66. Michael Bruch, Michael Kuhn & Gerhard Schmid, Power Blackout Risks: Risk
Management Options, Emerging Risk Initiative – Position Paper, CRO FORUM § 4, at 12
(Nov. 2011) [hereinafter Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid], https://www.allianz.com/v_1339677769000/
media/responsibility/documents/position_paper_power_blackout_risks.pdf. Id. § 4.1.
67. This law is also called Kirchhoff’s first law, Kirchhoff’s point rule, Kirchhoff’s
junction rule, and Kirchhoff’s first rule. The principle of conservation of electric charge
is that at any point in an electrical circuit where charge density is not changing in time, the
sum of currents flowing towards that point is equal to the sum of currents flowing away
from that point. See 2 STEVEN FERREY, 2 LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 10:98 (37th ed.
2015).
68. See Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe:
Thermodynamics, Mass and Energy, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 1839, 1911 n.406 (2004).
69. Brownouts are a drop in voltage delivered over the transmission system; blackouts
are a complete loss of electricity supply. Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid, supra note 66, § 2, at 4.
70. Matthew L. Wald, Richard Pérez-Peña & Neela Banerjee, The Blackout: What
Went Wrong; Experts Asking Why Problems Spread So Far, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003,
at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/16/nyregion/the-blackout-what-went-wrong-experts
asking-why-problems-spread-so-far.html (examining cause of the 2003 electricity blackout across
northeastern United States).
71. On February 26, 2008, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas grid operator,
which has significant wind power deployment, was unable to compensate with sufficient
backup power resources when there was an unexpected drop in wind power production by
more than 80 percent. Rebecca Smith, Texas to Probe Rolling Blackouts: State Wants to
Determine if Generators Gamed Prices as Power Failed in Storm, WALL STREET J. (Feb.
7, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487039895045761284
93806692106; Richard Cohen & Gerry Khermouch, How Renewables Can Be Undermined by
Intermittency, ELEC. J. 5, 6 (June 2008).
72. Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid, supra note 66, § 3.2.1, at 8.
73. Id. § 4.2, at 17.
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generation (DG) power is intermittent, the electricity grid must compensate
at a cost for less reliable variable DG impact on the system.
B. Intermittency of Renewable DG Power in a Volatile World
New intermittent wind and solar renewable resources cannot supply
reliable base load power, as they demonstrate a relatively low availability
factor in the 10–40% range of total hours during a week or month.74 The
recorded annual wind capacity factor in 2014 was 33.9%, while the median
wind capacity factor over the past decade was 31%.75 On average in Europe,
solar photovoltaic (PV) power can generate roughly 11% of the power of
its nameplate capacity.76 This means that a PV unit produces only 11% of
the potential energy generation it would produce at noon on a sunny day.
With power, the transmission and distribution system is critical.
Accommodations have been made for renewable DG: Prior to FERC
Order 764, hourly scheduling of resources for transmission service was
the norm; Order 764 requires that every transmission customer be given
the ability to adjust its schedule at fifteen-minute intervals to reflect changing
conditions of intermittent renewable energy generation.77 To integrate large
amounts of variable generation into the power system, techniques which

74. See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, § 2:11 (noting inability
of intermittent sources to serve as base-load resource).
75. Planning Engineer & Rud Istvan, True Costs of Wind Electricity, CLIMATE ETC.
(May 12, 2015), https://judithcurry.com/2015/05/12/true-costs-of-wind-electricity/ [https://perma.
cc/P3DF-688E]; Chriss W. Street, PUC’s Computer Tool Exposes Renewable Energy
Bloated Costs, BREITBART (May 31, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/California/2015/05/31/
pucs-computer-tool-exposes-renewable-energy-bloated-costs/ [https://perma.cc/FSX6-LN44].
76. Ed Hoskins, Charting the Costs and Effectiveness of Renewable Energy in
Europe, WORD PRESS (Jan. 22, 2015), https://edmhdotme.wordpress.com/2015/01/22/
charting-the-effectiveness-of-renewable-energy-in-europe/ [https://perma.cc/5U83-PJNA];
P. Gosselin, Analysis Shows Wind and Solar Power in Europe Is On Average 16 Times
More Expensive Than Gas-Fired Power!, NO TRICKS ZONE (Feb. 8, 2015), http://
notrickszone.com/2015/02/08/analysis-shows-wind-and-solar-power-in-europe-is-on
average-16-times-more-expensive-than-gas-fired-power [https://perma.cc/E7GE-BL52].
77. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, Order No. 764, 139 FERC ¶ 61,246,
at 2 (June 22, 2012).
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would facilitate such integration78 include faster generator dispatch and
scheduling79 and larger load balancing areas.80
As scheduling is altered to accommodate renewable DG, the question
remains how much system voltage fluctuation can be accommodated for
intermittent renewable power. The U.S. Department of Energy calculated
that approximately 20% wind power can be accommodated on the grid—
about the amount of back-up reserve margin in regional power systems—
without requiring additional storage or other mechanisms to accommodate
intermittency.81 With grid management, it is projected that a system could
handle up to 30% renewables penetration.82
C. Inability to Store Power
Unlike all other forms of energy, the moving electrons cannot be
efficiently stored as electricity for more than a second before, with nowhere
to go, they are converted to and lost as waste heat.83 Therefore, the supply
of electricity must match the demand for electricity over the centralized
utility grid on an instantaneous, constant, real-time, and ongoing basis, or
else the electric system shuts down or expensive equipment is damaged.84

78. M. Milligan & B. Kirby, Impact of Balancing Area Size, Obligation Sharing,
and Ramping Capability on Wind Integration 39 (Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab.,
Conference Paper 2007), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy07osti/41809.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HV8Z-QEXW].
79. Sub-hourly scheduling will greatly reduce variable energy resources (VER)
integration costs. Faster—sub-hourly—power system dispatch and scheduling would allow
system operators to more quickly and efficiently respond to power system output variations.
The Avista wind integration study similarly found wind integration costs would be reduced
by forty to sixty percent by moving from hourly to sub-hourly dispatch intervals. Final
Report Avista Corporation Wind Integration Study, ENERNEX CORP. 48 (Mar. 2007),
http://www.uwig.org/AvistaWindIntegrationStudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FC3-UUNC].
80. Greater cooperation or even consolidation among the roughly 125 existing
balancing areas. Variable energy integration costs are greatly reduced if wind resources
are geographically diverse as opposed to being concentrated in a small area. Developing
regional load following and ancillary services markets would also alleviate an individual
balancing area’s burden to provide all ancillary services from its own resources.
81. Jennifer DeCesaro, et al., Wind Energy and Power System Operations: A
Review of Wind Integration Studies to Date, 22 ELEC. J. 34, 42 (Dec. 2009). Wind, being
at off-peak times in many locations, will tend to displace typical coal base-load power,
while solar PV units will tend to displace typical on-peak gas-fired peaking generation
units. Id.
82. See PJM Renewable Integration Study Executive Summary Report, GEN. ELECT.
INT’L 6–7 (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/subcommittees/irs/
postings/pris-executive-summary.ashx [https://perma.cc/D586-BEQB].
83. FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 65, at 568.
84. Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid, supra note 66, § 3.1.2, at 6; see FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, supra note 65, at 568.
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Either too much or too little power causes system instability on a real-time,
second-by-second basis.85
We have mobilized some second-best alternatives to manage these
imbalances. We can convert electricity either into chemical energy stored
in batteries, physical energy potential stored as compressed air, stored weight
in greater elevated reservoir capacity in hydroelectric pumped storage
facilities, active physical energy stored in flywheel revolution, or thermal
energy as heat storage.86 Pumped storage of water is the only significant
storage deployed for the past half-century; however, it cannot fill the entire
need and the contribution of other storage is minimal.87
Battery storage has emerged as the key storage link for more deployment
of intermittent sources of renewable energy. Lithium-ion and lead-acid
batteries could change electric technology in the near future by providing
economic storage of intermittent power, although the storage costs are still
high.88 The performance of lithium-ion batteries degrades over time, in
correlation with the frequency and depth of cycling to a degree not yet
tested, which they will do on a daily basis assisting DG. The bankruptcies
of American battery makers such as A123 Systems and Ener1 have caused
uncertainty on economic battery development over the past years.89
85. Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid, supra note 66, § 3.1.2, at 6.
86. Id. at § 2; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GRID ENERGY STORAGE 11 (Dec. 2013),
http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/09/f18/Grid%20Energy%20Storage%20Dec
ember%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C6T-6QQF].
87. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grid_energy_storage#Batteries [https://perma.cc/
PN58-H4Z8] (surveying the forms of energy storage of electricity). Total world battery,
compressed air, flywheel, and thermal storage capacity still amounts to only about 1.2
GWh. GRID ENERGY STORAGE, supra note 86, at 11.
88. Rickerson, supra note 48, at 33 (“Prices for lithium-ion batteries are projected
to fall from $700/kWh in 2013 to $300/kWh in 2020–2025.”) (citing Peter Bronski et. al.,
The Economics of Grid Defection: When and Where Distributed Solar Generation Plus
Storage Competes with Traditional Utility Service, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. 24 fig.19 (2014)).
89. See Bill Vlasic & Matthew L. Wald, Maker of Batteries Files for Bankruptcy,
N.Y. T IMES (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/battery
maker-a123-systems-files-for-bankruptcy.html?_r=0; Phil Milford & Dawn McCarty,
Ener1, Parent of U.S. Subsidized Battery Unit, Seeks Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan.
26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-01-26/ener1-electric-car
battery-maker-seeks-chapter-11-bankruptcy-protection [https://perma.cc/5Q9F-FANW];
Michael Bathon, Wanxiang Wins U.S. Approval to Buy Battery Maker A213, BLOOMBERG
TECH. (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-29/wanxiang
wins-cfius-approval-to-buy-bankrupt-battery-maker-a123 [https://perma.cc/DZZ9-QDHG].
A123, for instance, ended up in Chinese hands when Wanxiang Group bought the battery
maker at a bankruptcy auction. Todd Woody, California Launches First “Battery University”
to Push Energy Storage Technology, Q UARTZ (Apr. 22, 2013), http://qz.com/77045/
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There was a supposed battery breakthrough in May 2015 when Tesla
Motors announced the availability of a new advanced battery for purposes
of solar storage for rooftop solar PV systems. However, subsequent
observers assessed the technology, and despite its overwhelming initial
popularity, they found it both ill-adapted and uneconomical because it
could not handle regular charging.90 It can supply only two kilowatts of
continuous power, which is less than a home requires.91 To obtain sixteen
kilowatts of continuous power, one could purchase eight stacked Tesla
batteries at a cost of $45,000, or one could purchase a $3,700 Generac
generator from Home Depot to get the same amount of power.92 Critics
state that the new Solar City Powerwall battery offered for distributed
solar backup does not improve the economics of solar, and solar does not
improve the economics of the battery, compared to net metering rates
available in the vast majority of states.93 Bill Gates recently stated:
“There’s no battery technology that’s even close to allowing us to take all
of our energy from renewables . . . [it’s necessary] to deal not only with
the 24-hour cycle but also with long periods of time where it’s cloudy and
you don’t have sun or you don’t have wind.”94
Net metering, a regulatory mechanism, substitutes virtual imaginary
storage for real energy storage. With net metering, one doesn’t need individual
storage capacity: The utility provides the equivalent of free personal storage
for distributed generators, with costs passed on not to the beneficiary
generator of the storage, but to the 99% of non-net metering customers.95
However, the electricity itself is not actually stored; electricity is either
instantaneously sold to others with the utility as the intermediary, or lost
the moment it is not used.
california-launches-first-battery-university-to-push-energy-storage-technology [https://perma.cc/
6XXT-6MR5]. California is trying to take the lead in battery research at a time when
China is also working hard on it. Id.
90. Tom Randall, Tesla’s New Battery Doesn’t Work That Well With Solar,
BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-06/tesla
s-new-battery-doesn-t-work-that-well-with-solar [https://perma.cc/W5W6-Z9Y3].
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Steve Huntoon, That Old Musk Magic: Is Musk’s Battery Better Than a BackUp Generator?, F ORTNIGHTLY ’ S S PARK (May 20, 2015), http://spark.fortnightly.com/
fortnightly/old-musk-magic?page=0%2C1 [https://perma.cc/R6ER-HSKY].
94. Lewis Page, Gates: Renewable Energy Can’t Do the Job. Gov Should Switch
Green Subsidies into R&D, REGISTER (June 26, 2015, 3:03 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2015/06/26/gates_renewable_energy_cant_do_the_job_gov_should_switch_green_subsi
dies_into_rd [https://perma.cc/XPQ9-QMUF].
95. See Ker Than, As Solar Power Grows, Dispute Flares Over U.S. Utility Bills,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 25, 2013, 10:10 PM), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/
news/energy/2013/12/131226-utilities-dispute-net-metering-for-solar/ [https://perma.cc/
TZD2-MUWT].
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Research at Stanford calculated that the amount of energy required to
create a large ground-mounted solar generation facility is comparable to
the energy used to build each of five different battery technologies:
“Using batteries to store solar power during periods of low demand would,
therefore, be energetically favorable.”96 However, for wind farms, while
curtailing wind power reduces the energy return on investment by 10%,
storing surplus wind-generated electricity in batteries results in even
greater reductions on investment return, from about 20% for lithium-ion
batteries to more than 50% for lead-acid batteries:
Ideally, the energetic cost of curtailing a resource should at least equal the amount
of energy it cost to store it . . . That’s the case for photovoltaics, but for wind farms,
the energetic cost of curtailment is much lower than for battery storage. Therefore, it
would actually be more energetically efficient to shut down a wind turbine than
to store the surplus electricity it generates.97

Grid voltage or frequency fluctuations can cause stability issues when PV
inverters trip off when solar stops being produced, either temporarily or
for the evening.98 Mitigation measures for this greater instability could
include grid reinforcement, installation of on-load tap changers, advanced
voltage control for HV transformers, installing a booster transformer, or
installing static volt ampere reactive (VAR) control.99 Advanced PV inverters
can provide low-voltage ride-through capabilities with frequency control
or dynamic reactive support.100 So even if there is a way technically to
accommodate this DG intermittency, it adds a new cost that so far in most
states is not being billed to those who use DG, but to all ratepayers.101

96. Mark Shwartz, Stanford Scientists Calculate the Energy Required to Store Wind
and Solar Power on the Grid, STAN. NEWS (Sept. 9, 2013), http://news.stanford.edu/news/
2013/september/curtail-energy-storage-090913.html [https://perma.cc/AR9B-AZHN] (explaining
that pumped hydro storage of water is used in almost all electricity grid storage, with an
energy return on investment ten times better than conventional batteries (reporting on
Charles J. Barnhart, Michael Dale, Adam R. Brandt & Sally M. Benson, The Energetic
Implications of Curtailing Versus Storing Solar- and Wind-Generated Electricity, 6
ENERGY & ENVTL. SCI. 2804 (2013), http://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlepdf/2013/ee/
c3ee41973h [https://perma.cc/F3LM-SK8H])).
97. Id.
98. Rickerson, supra note 48, at 54.
99. Id. at 55–56.
100. Id. at 58. The current international standard for inverters is IEEE 1547, and
some states, such as Massachusetts, are pushing further ahead. Id.
101. Id. at 37.
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D. The Volt of Reliability
Distribution utilities must maintain a uniform, interconnected system to
deliver electricity to customers within narrow ranges of specified voltage
levels as required by the National Electricity Reliability Council (NERC),
a voluntary technical grid maintenance organization, and state rules.102
When PV solar or other distributed generation resources are introduced
onto the grid, this can affect the stability of line voltages depending upon
generator rating, available solar resources, load, line conditions, and other
factors.103 Also, at the distribution level of the utility system, PV systems
are more geographically concentrated. Depending on concentration and
weather variability, PV system intermittency of operation could cause
fluctuations in utility distribution system voltage that would require additional
regulation or additional equipment to maintain the technical stability of
the system.104
When solar PV output on distribution lines exceeds the instantaneous
load on those lines, it can cause power back-flows between the low-voltage
and medium-voltage lines.105 There are stability issues when PV inverters
trip off because of grid voltage or frequency fluctuations.106 In the most
solar U.S. state, Hawaii, solar PV units in certain areas back-feed into the
circuit and cause voltage increases and other power quality issues.107
Since reliability matters, what equipment do we use to compensate?
E. Grid Compensation: Ramping
There are significant externalities whenever an electric system changes.
First, grid modifications, upgraded circuits and transformers, and expansion
of the transmission and distribution infrastructure is necessary to accommodate
an increased percentage of renewables.108 The $7 billion Competitive
Renewal Energy Zones (CREZ) project is Texas’s most expensive
transmission subsidy to date, and its total cost falls on consumers of Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the Texas ISO, at a cost which the
Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) estimates as $6 per month on the
102. Id. at 53.
103. Id. at 52–53.
104. Rickerson, supra note 48, at 53–54.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 54.
107. Id. at 52. Advanced inverters can provide support to network stability. Upgrading
inverters can also help. Germany has required that inverters on an estimated 315,000 PV
systems be retrofitted in an effort to improve electricity system reliability and prevent
potential instability issues. Id.
108. Lincoln Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L.
REV. 937, 1002 (2014).
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average consumer bill.109 Germany’s switch to more intermittent renewable
generation already resulted in an additional 1 billion Euro cost, with tens of
billions more of investment required.110
FIGURE 2: CALIFORNIA DAILY DEMAND AND RAMPING

Source: California ISO, http://www.caliso.com/Documents/Briefing_DuckCurve_Current
SystemConditions-ISOPresentation-July2015.pdf.

Figure 2 shows the “duck curve” illustrating California Independent
System Operator projections of different demand in different years due to
the additional amount of DG solar power. A typical day’s electricity demand
in California has historically featured two peaks in power demand—one
in late morning and a larger one in the late afternoon. There’s a demand
trough, or “shoulder,” period between them. Because electricity cannot
109. Bill Peacock, Texas’ Renewable Energy Experiment: High Costs, Poor Results,
TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND. 2 (Dec. 2010), http://www.texaspolicy.com/sites/default/files/
documents/2010-12-PP25-TexasRenewableEnergyExperiment-paper4-bp.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KB64-PSBC]; Matthew L. Wald, Texas Is Wired for Wind Power, and More Farms Plug
In, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/business/energy
environment/texas-is-wired-for-wind-power-and-more-farms-plug-in.html?_r=1.
110. Davies & Allen, supra note 108, at 1007 & n.419.
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be stored,111 fleets of different power generation facilities are equipped to
follow this pattern of daily electricity demand fluctuation and to match
with adequate supply the ramp-up and ramp-down of demand in order to
supply simultaneous power equal to coincident demand for power.
After substantial solar PV development in California, the details of the
daily demand curve make it look like a very different animal. First, solar
panels crank out power only during the midday hours when the sun is high
and the tilt of the PV panels most efficiently captures the angle of solar
energy from the sun’s arc across the sky. The overall demand for power
from grids’ central power plants during the shoulder period in the middle
of the day declines substantially. This is shown by the more-dipping belly
line of the duck curve with each additional year of solar deployment, as
more midday solar substitutes for fossil and other generation during limited
midday hours. On-site behind-the-meter consumption of the power produced
slashes conventional demand.
Second, this is a fast-evolving change over just a few years’ time that
corresponds to the increased installation of solar capacity. In less than a
decade, this could cut demand for central-station power almost in half, but
only at certain sunny mid-day times. Because of the restricted number of
hours during which a PV unit can generate power at full capacity, at U.S.
latitudes, a solar panel can generate much less than 20% of its rated full
capacity. Solar PV energy production could grow so much that by 2020
the demand for grid-provided electricity would be lower at 12:00 noon
than at 12:00 midnight.112 The two peak periods form the head and tail of
the duck curve at different ends of daylight hours; this solar dip in the
middle of the day forms the belly of the duck curve.
Third, the deep dip in central-station grid demand during the middle of
the day—the duck curve’s belly—has significant implications for the
costs of keeping the grid operating efficiently. States would need more
power plants because for the vast majority of hours during the year, solar
and wind projects do not generate power, and other conventional power
supply options or greater energy efficiency must fill this gap.
Furthermore, the curve shows that the projected growth for residential
solar power can make only a limited contribution to serve the late afternoon
major system demand peak, but has a huge impact on greatly displacing
traditional mid-day “shoulder” loads.113 And the slope of the late afternoon
peak gets steeper each successive year because grids must ramp up massive

111. See supra Section III.C.
112. See fig.2.
113. Planning Engineer, More Renewables? Watch Out For the Duck Curve, CLIMATE
ETC. (Nov. 5, 2014), https://judithcurry.com/2014/11/05/more-renewables-watch-out-for
the-duck-curve/ [https://perma.cc/A3X6-NYE4].
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amounts of additional conventional power very quickly when solar rapidly
dies each afternoon. Steeply sloped curves of DG generation contribution
can be difficult for a system because they increase the risk of overgeneration and the need for hard ramping of fossil-fuel units in the
afternoon—just as demand is increasing and solar is stopping.114 When
solar is a significant part of the bulk generation supply, the stress on
remaining generation units as they work to meet the steep increase from
afternoon to evening loads will be exacerbated.115 Adding a significant
intermittent DG component increases the need for spinning reserve,
increases the amount of fuel consumed to spin that reserve, and increases
the system’s out-of-pocket fuel and other marginal costs incurred to
maintain a reliable power system.116
1. Traditional Fossil Units Spinning Reserve
Even at 20% wind penetration in a grid, there could be a 33–50%
decline in the running of combined cycle fossil-fuel generation units, and
it is unclear whether these units could run profitably at these levels, or
would exit participation in the market.117 Coal-fired units are typically
large because coal is a less dense fossil fuel, and these units must operate
at 45–50% or more of their design capacities.118 If coal-fired power plants
are forced to cycle on and off more frequently in order to fill the
generation gaps created by intermittent generation flickering in and out of
the system, it will result in significantly higher operation and maintenance
expenses, increased heat rate which is a proxy for inefficiency of electricity
production, increased start-up costs, and a shorter life of the unit.119
One analysis of coal-plant cycling against intermittent renewable power’s
hourly variations found that environmental emissions during cycling were
8% higher for sulfur dioxide and 10% higher for nitrogen oxides than
emissions of the same compounds during constant operation.120 See
Figure 3. Some studies estimate added carbon emissions from ramping
backup fossil-fired power to offset the carbon emission saved by wind or
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See J. Nicholas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in
Integrating Large Levels of Wind Power Generation, 23 ELEC. J. 33, 34 (Aug.–Sept. 2010).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 37.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 38.
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solar energy by approximately 20%.121 Moreover, while generators “spin” to
increase their temperatures to their design values, so as to immediately fill
each gap created by intermittent power supply, the power that these
spinning units produce may or may not be used by the grid, thus incurring
power “uplift” costs to the grid.122
FIGURE 3: POWER CYCLING & RESULTANT EMISSIONS

This need for spinning reserve of traditional units would call on existing
coal, oil, or natural gas plants to spin. While the more modern coal plants
have the ability to ramp up and down more flexibly than older units, they
do not have the flexibility to match the ongoing real-time variability
fluctuations in wind power availability to keep the grid constantly supplied.123
Even though natural gas combined cycle turbine facilities are better equipped
to cycle up and down than coal plants—and can be modified to increase
their start-up times by up to 50% to accommodate pressure and temperature
transients of their steam turbines and readiness of their heat recovery steam
generators—this flexibility still may not be able to follow the ongoing
intermittency of greater renewable power in the grid.124

121. Warren Katzenstein & Jay Apt, Air Emissions Due to Wind and Solar Power,
43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 253–58 (2009).
122. Puga, supra note 116, at 34.
123. Id.
124. Id.

244

FERREY (DO NOT DELETE)

10/17/2018 1:16 PM

Net Legal Power

[VOL. 53: 221, 2016]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

As one redeploys existing fossil-fuel facilities to fill growing gaps
created by intermittent power, there is an efficiency and environmental
price which few state studies have recognized.125 Gas combined cycle
units will experience higher heat rates, less efficient operation, greater
maintenance expenses, and consequent unavailability.126 Ramping fossil
generation units can increase maintenance costs and cause earlier
replacements of certain generation facility components.127 European data
illustrates that its shift from traditional coal unit operation to more operation
of natural gas-fired combined cycle units resulted in an increase in these
units’ operation & maintenance (O&M) costs, an increase in outages, and
a decrease in availability.128
2. New Power Units Ramping
If the ambitious levels of renewable generation (mainly wind) established by RPS
[renewable portfolio standard] mandates are to be successfully integrated into
electricity markets, policymakers and regulators will have to make sure that fast
up- and down-ramping generation resources are available as operating reserves
to the grid operator.129

There is a need for installation on the grid of more quick-start spinning
reserve to respond to the constant intermittency of solar and wind generation
and provide load-following generation.130 Building this new generation
requires a significant capital outlay, which is only used to supply sporadic
load-following services to fill the gaps in intermittent power supply. There
is a very large and often uncalculated cost to maintain reliability of the
electric system, necessary if and only if, additional intermittent power is

125. Randy T. Simmons et al., The True Cost of Energy: Wind Power, INST. OF
POLITIAL ECON., UT. STATE U. 9 (July 2015), http://www.strata.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
07/Full-Report-True-Cost-of-Wind1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5H6-C5PL].
126. Id.
127. Rickerson, supra note 48, at 52.
128. W. Edward Platt & Richard B. Jones, The Impact of Carbon Trading on
Performance: What Europe’s Experience Can Teach North American Generators, POWER
(Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.powermag.com/the-impact-of-carbon-trading-on-performance
what-europes-experience-can-teach-north-american-generators [https://perma.cc/8GMG
HH88].
129.
Puga, supra note 116, at 42; see also A. Ohler & K. Radusewicz, Indirect
Impacts in Illinois from a Renewable Portfolio Standard, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 65, 65 (Aug.–
Sept. 2010), www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1040619010001971/pdfft?md5
=d89cb161013fae68d71f280064dcfd77&pid=1-s2.0-S1040619010001971-main.pdf.
130. Puga, supra note 116, at 42.
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given first-priority to supply power.131 Ramping and cycling is estimated
to add $23/MWh to the delivered cost of wind energy. 132 With a lower
capacity factor than wind, solar would experience a higher per megawatthour ramping charge than does wind power.
The questions that all of the studies and literature fail to address are:
Who is the cost causer, and who should be the payer for these additional
costs to alter the power system—the most capital-intensive sector of the
U.S. economy?133 There are two bi-polar options for this cost allocation:




Allocate the cost of new quick-start ramping generation
and power storage to the owners of intermittent power
generation whose entrance to the market necessitates these
investments, or
Allocate these costs to all consumers of power by raising
all power rates.

The choice to date in U.S. states is to allocate these storage, ramping,
and back-up supply costs to all consumers, rather than to the 1% who are
generators of intermittent power responsible for necessitating these ramping
and storage investments. California has ordered its utilities to build
additional significant storage capacity each year, which is to be billed to
all utility consumers who do not supply power themselves or require or
utilize this storage of energy.134 Germany is far more advanced than the
United States in deploying DG intermittent power: There are five times as
many potential disruptions due to German grid instability—caused in
significant part by more intermittent generation—as four years before,
raising the risk of blackouts.135
131. ISO-NE and PJM ISO require that if bid at a market-clearing price or having
“must take” status, which all solar power does, is taken as initial supply whenever it is
supplied to the grid without advance scheduling or bidding supply into the system. See
Jeremy Elmer, Working With the ISO to Integrate Renewable Energy in New England,
CONSERVATION L. FOUND. (Sept. 15, 2014) (emphasis added), http://www.clf.org/blog/cleanenergy-climate-change/renewable-energy-in-new-england [https://perma.cc/36XZ-KCZZ]
(“Wind, like solar energy, is not a dispatchable power source; that is, it cannot be turned
on at will”).
132. Michael Giberson, Assessing Wind Power Cost Estimates, INST. FOR ENERGY
R ES . 9 (Oct. 2013), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
Giberson-study-Final.pdf.
133. SIMMONS ET AL., supra note 125, at 9.
134. A.B. 2514, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010). See Marc Campopiano et al.,
California Public Utilities Commission Approves Pioneering Energy Storage Mandate,
LATHAM & WATKINS: CLEAN ENERGY L. REP. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.cleanenergylaw
report.com/energy-regulatory/california-public-utilities-commission-approves-pioneeringenergy-storage-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/DL7T-KCXE].
135.
Julia Mengewein, German Utilities Bail Out Electric Grid at Wind’s Mercy,
BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-24/german
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IV. THE LEGAL VORTEX
A. The Federal Level: FERC Commerce Clause Power
Regarding Distributed Generation
1. FERC Jurisdiction
FERC has pressed for more competition in energy supply and transmission
over a two-decade period. In Order No. 888,136 the Commission established
the foundation for non-discriminatory open access transmission service
by electric utilities. All regulated public utilities that own, control, or
operate jurisdictional transmission facilities are required by FERC Order
888 to have open access transmission tariffs (OATTs) that must track the
FERC-mandated pro forma open access transmission tariff.137 The pro
forma tariff requires that the transmission provider plan and construct
additional transmission facilities to serve network customers “on a basis
comparable to the Transmission Provider’s delivery of its own generating
and purchased resources to its Native Load Customers.”138 FERC promulgated
a revised pro forma OATT in Order 888-A, providing an incumbent customer
with a right of first refusal (ROFR) to match the duration offered by a new

utilities-bail-out-electric-grid-at-wind-s-mercy. One grid operator required balancing adjusts
of generation 1,009 times in 2013 to stabilize the grid, and 209 times in 2010. Id. In
Germany’s balancing market auctions, winning bidders have been paid as much as 13,922
euros ($18,700) to pledge set aside one megawatt for balancing services provided on notice
of 15 minutes, 5 minutes, or 30 seconds. Id.
136. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,540 (May 10, 1996), clarified, 76 FERC ¶ 61,009 (1996) and 76 FERC ¶ 61,347 (1996),
reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 (Mar. 14,
1997), clarified, 79 FERC ¶ 61,182 (1997), reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248,
62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (Dec. 9, 1997), reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998),
aff’d, Transmission Access Pol’y Study Grp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 225
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d, New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
137. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(a), (c) (2011).
138. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72
Fed. Reg. 12,266, 12,521 (Mar. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37).
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customer at a full OATT rate.139 Non-public utilities may have “reciprocity”
open access transmission tariffs.140
In Order No. 890,141 the Commission amended the Order No. 888 pro
forma tariff to require transmission providers to plan for the needs of their
customers on a comparable basis to planning for their own needs.142 To
better ensure that planning and construction occur in a non-unduly
discriminatory manner, Orders No. 890 and 890-A mandated coordinated,
open and transparent transmission planning on a local and regional level.143
139. Idaho Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulator Comm’n, 312 F.3d 454, 457 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); see also Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274, 12,274 (Mar. 14, 1997)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). FERC ordered Idaho Power Co. to continue to supply
power to an incumbent customer at the end of its contract term even though a merchant
customer had offered more attractive contract term. Idaho Power Co. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 312 F.3d 454, 457–58. The Court of Appeals reversed the FERC
Order and held that an incumbent must match a new potential customer’s superior offer.
Id. at 463–65. A right of first refusal is a right to match the terms of a third party’s highest
offer. Id. at 456–57.
140. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(a), (e). “Reciprocity” provides a so-called safe harbor, ensuring
that the non-public utility is entitled to transmission service from public entities. Id.
141. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72
Fed. Reg. 12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 and 37), reh’g, Order
No. 890-A, 73 Fed. Reg. 2984 (Jan. 16, 2008), reh’g, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ¶
61,299 (2008), reh’g, Order No. 890-C, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228 (2009).
142. N.Y. Reg’l Interconnect, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 634 F.3d
581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission
Service, Order No. 890, FERC Stats & Regs. ¶ 31,241 (2007).
143. FERC explained that in light of a decline in investment relative to load growth
resulting in increased congestion and a reduced access to alternative sources of energy, as
well as a disincentive to remedy congestion on a non-unduly discriminatory basis, reform
of the Order No. 888 and 888-A pro forma tariff was needed. The Commission identified
nine planning principles in Order No. 890 that must be satisfied for a transmission provider’s
planning process to be considered compliant with that order. These nine planning principles
are:
(1) Coordination–the process for consulting with transmission customers and
neighboring transmission providers;
(2) Openness–planning meetings must be open to all affected parties;
(3) Transparency–access must be provided to the methodology, criteria, and
processes used to develop transmission plans;
(4) Information Exchange–the obligations of and methods for customers to
submit data to transmission providers must be described;
(5) Comparability–transmission plans must meet the specific service requests
of transmission customers and otherwise treat similarly-situated customers
(e.g., network and retail native load) comparably in transmission system
planning;
(6) Dispute Resolution–an alternative dispute resolution process to address both
procedural and substantive planning issues must be included;
(7) Regional Participation–there must be a process for coordinating with
interconnected systems;
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In Order No. 2000,144 the Commission encouraged the development of
Regional Transmission Organizations to form “competitive wholesale electric
[] markets,”145 which the Commission needed in order to incorporate non
discriminatory transmission service.146 All of these orders facilitated renewable
DG, and other types of DG, to move power to all points in the grid without
financial impediments.
FERC Order 764 changed wholesale utility planning and administration
to provide advantages to competitive alternatives of renewable power.
Prior to FERC Order 764, hourly scheduling of resources for transmission
service was the norm. Wind generators had difficulty meeting hourly
schedules because of significant variation in generation output within an
hour, due to wind velocity changes.147 In Order 764, FERC allowed every
transmission customer to adjust its schedule at fifteen-minute intervals to
reflect changing conditions.148 FERC now treats transmission systems as
integrated networks with widely dispersed benefits.
In amending 18 C.F.R. Part 35 in Order No. 764,149 FERC concluded:
“Changes in the generation mix and underlying public policies influencing
investment in VER generation have accentuated the need to reform existing
practices that unduly discriminate against VERs or otherwise impair the

(8) Economic Planning Studies–study procedures must be provided for economic
upgrades to address congestion or the integration of new resources, both
locally and regionally; and
(9) Cost Allocation–a process must be included for allocating costs of new
facilities that do not fit under existing rate structures, such as regional projects.
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890
A, 121 FERC ¶ 61,297 (2007).
144. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶
31,089 (1999), order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,092 (2000),
petitions for review dismissed, Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., Wash. v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
145. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 454 F.3d 278,
280–81 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
146. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(k)(7) (2006).
147. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 139 FERC ¶ 61,246, at para. 22
(2012). Wind generator’s plant factors on the Bonneville Power Administration system
averaged 27.1%, but the generator, under the old standards, had to pay the peak level of
transmission required to carry the generator’s load. See Michael Dotten, New Developments
Integrating Wind and Solar Power into the Grid Power, MARTEN LAW (Apr. 14, 2014),
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20140415-integrating-wind-solar-power-grid#_edn11
[https://perma.cc/98BG-ULEC] (citing Integration of Variable Energy Resources, supra).
148. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, supra note 147, at paras. 2, 21, 97.
149. See id. at paras. 11, 24 (2012).
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ability of public utility transmission providers and their customers to
manage costs associated with VER integration effectively.”150 FERC Order
764 requires that interconnecting DG generators pay for any incremental
generation required, subject to reimbursement for generators who later
interconnect to the increased transmission capacity.151
Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in a much-watched unanimous decision, affirmed the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s approval of the Midwest Independent Service
Operator’s (MISO)152 proportionate customer utility allocation of transmission
costs for high-voltage transmission lines to move renewable wind power
to populated areas.153 The opinion relied on this Author’s 2013 law review
article on Constitutional energy issues for its authority on the respective
jurisdiction of state and federal governments to regulate electricity.154
FERC Order No. 1000 requires transmission system owners to engage
in regional and interregional transmission planning. FERC approves all
regional transmission organizations (RTO) and independent system operator
(ISO) terms of service and the financial tariffs.155 FERC Order 1000 requires
incumbent transmission providers, utilities, and the RTOs that manage
regional multi-state transmission access to the grid to remove rights-of
first-refusal (ROFRs) from FERC-approved transmission tariffs.156 FERC
Order No. 1000 addressed the difference between an obligation to build
in one’s transmission zone and a federal right of first refusal: “[W]e do
not believe that [the] obligation [to build] is necessarily dependent on the
incumbent transmission provider having a corresponding federal right of

150. Id. at para. 21.
151. Michael Dotten, supra note 147.
152. MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and
parts of Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana. See
Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764, 770 (7th Cir.
2013).
153. Id. MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects among all of the
utilities that draw power from the MISO grid in proportion to each utilities’ overall volume
of usage; FERC approved MISO’s rate design, which led some states to initiate court
appeal. Id. at 772–73.
154. Id. at 776 (citing Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle, supra note 11,
at 69, 106–07).
155. FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 26, at 49–50.
156. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, FERC Stats & Regs. ¶ 61,051, at paras. 7,313
(July 21, 2011) [hereinafter Order No. 1000]. For an excellent treatment of this, please
see Rishi Garg, What’s Best for the States: A Federally Imposed Competitive Solicitation
Model or a Preference for the Incumbent? State Adoption of Right of First Refusal Statutes
in Response to FERC Order 1000 and the Dormant Commerce Clause (Nat’l Reg. Res.
Inst., Briefing Paper No. 13–04, 2013).
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first refusal to prevent other entities from constructing and owning new
transmission facilities located in that region.”157
2. Limits on FERC Jurisdiction
FERC lacks jurisdiction over the siting, construction, or ownership of
transmission facilities, which are exclusively within state jurisdiction.158
FERC case law exerts exclusive jurisdiction over the “transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce” and over “all facilities for such
transmission or sale of electric energy.”159 The U.S. Supreme Court held
that Congress meant to draw a “bright line,” easily ascertained and not
requiring case-by-case analysis, between state and federal jurisdiction.160
When a transaction is subject to exclusive federal FERC jurisdiction and
regulation, state regulation is preempted as a matter of federal law and the
U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, according to a long-standing
and consistent line of rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court.161
157. Order No. 1000, supra note 156, at para. 261.
158. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d 304,
309–10, 313 (4th Cir. 2009).
159. 16 USC § 824(b); e.g., Pa. Power & Light Co., 23 FERC ¶ 61,006, at 61,018,
reh’g denied, 23 FERC ¶ 61,325 (1983); S. Co. Servs., Inc., 37 FERC ¶ 61,256, at 61,652
(1986); Fla. Power & Light Co., 40 FERC ¶ 61,045, at 61,120–21, reh’g denied, 41 FERC
¶ 61,153, at 61,382 (1987); Houlton Water Co. v. Me. Pub. Serv. Co., 60 FERC ¶ 61,141,
at 61,515 (1992); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 66 FERC ¶ 61,213, at 61,488 (1994); Conn. Light
& Power Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,012, at 61,030, reh’g denied, 71 FERC ¶ 61,035 (1995); Cent.
Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,194, at 61,973–75 (1998); Progress Energy, Inc., 97
FERC ¶ 61,141, at 61,628 (2001); Armstrong Energy Ltd. P’ship, LLLP, 99 FERC ¶
61,024, at 61,104 (2002); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 100 FERC ¶ 61,019, at para. 17
(2002); Barton Vill., Inc. v. Citizens Utils. Co., 100 FERC ¶ 61,244, at para. 12 (2002);
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 103 FERC ¶ 61,109, at para. 6 (2003); S. Cal. Edison Co., 106
FERC ¶ 61,183, at paras. 14, 19 (2004); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.,
106 FERC ¶ 61,337, at para. 14 & n.17 (2004); Entergy Servs., Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 61,020,
at para. 28 (2007); Aquila Merch. Servs., Inc., 125 FERC ¶ 61,175, at para. 17 (2008).
160. Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
161. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341–42 (1982). The
Supreme Court overturned an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission
that restrained within the state, for the financial advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost
hydroelectric energy produced within the state. Id. at 344. It held this to be an
impermissible violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, and the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–828 (2012): “Our cases
consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution . . . precludes a state
from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state
consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the products derived
therefrom.” Id. at 338. See also Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39,

251

FERREY (DO NOT DELETE)

10/17/2018 1:16 PM

FERC efforts to increase participation of demand response have encountered
recent legal impediments that provide additional advantages to distributed,
intermittent generation. In Order Nos. 719 and 719-A,162 FERC adopted
50 (2003); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 377 (1988);
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 964 (1986); Mont.-Dakota Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951).
162. In Order No. 719-A, at paragraphs 2–7, the Commission delineated the
improvements adopted in Order No. 719:
2. In the area of demand response, the Commission required each RTO and
ISO to: (1) accept bids from demand response resources in RTOs’ and
ISOs’ markets for certain ancillary services on a basis comparable to other
resources; (2) eliminate, during a system emergency, a charge to a buyer
that takes less electric energy in the real-time market than it purchased in
the day-ahead market; (3) in certain circumstances, permit an aggregator
of retail customers (ARC) to bid demand response on behalf of retail
customers directly into the organized energy market; and (4) modify their
market rules, as necessary, to allow the market-clearing price, during periods
of operating reserve shortage, to reach a level that rebalances supply and
demand so as to maintain reliability while providing sufficient provisions
for mitigating market power.
3. Additionally, the Commission recognized that further reforms may be
necessary to eliminate barriers to demand response in the future. To that
end, the Commission required each RTO or ISO to assess and report on
any remaining barriers to comparable treatment of demand response
resources that are within the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Commission
further required each RTO’s or ISO’s Independent Market Monitor to
submit a report describing its views on its RTO’s or ISO’s assessment to
the Commission.
4. With regard to long-term power contracting, the Commission required
each RTO and ISO to dedicate a portion of its web sites for market
participants to post offers to buy or sell power on a long-term basis.
5. To improve market monitoring, the Commission required each RTO and
ISO to provide its Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) with access to market
data, resources and personnel sufficient to carry out their duties, and
required the MMU to report directly to the RTO or ISO board of directors.
In addition, the Commission required that the MMU’s functions include:
(1) identifying ineffective market rules and recommending proposed rules
and tariff changes; (2) reviewing and reporting on the performance of the
wholesale markets to the RTO or ISO, the Commission, and other interested
entities; and (3) notifying appropriate Commission staff of instances in
which a market participant’s or the RTO’s or ISO’s behavior may require
investigation.
6. The Commission also took the following actions with regard to MMUs:
(1) expanded the list of recipients of MMU recommendations regarding
rule and tariff changes, and broadened the scope of behavior to be reported
to the Commission; (2) modified MMU participation in tariff administration
and market mitigation, required each RTO and ISO to include ethics standards
for MMU employees in its tariff, and required each RTO and ISO to consolidate
all its MMU provisions in one section of its tariff; and (3) expanded the
dissemination of MMU market information to a broader constituency, with
reports made on a more frequent basis than in the past, and reduced the
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changes in demand response and use of market pricing to elicit demand
response during periods of operating reserve shortages, long-term power
contracting, and market monitoring. In Order No. 745, FERC required
ISOs to pay implementers of demand-response reductions in power demand
the same price that the ISOs pay conventional suppliers of power.163
In a 2014 split decision, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
overturned FERC’s Order No. 745 rule requiring ISO and RTOs to pay
electricity consumers—on an equal basis as generators were paid—for
“demand response” reducing electric usage during certain high-demand
periods.164 The court ruled that Order No. 745 was FERC regulation of
retail sales of electricity, exclusively within the legal authority of states.165
In addition to exercising intruding jurisdiction, the court majority found
that FERC failed to address arguments that the authorized demand response
payments were excessive, at the same price paid to wholesale energy
suppliers.166 The Supreme Court overturned this decision in 2016, upholding
Order 745.167

time period before energy market bid and offer data are released to
the public.
7. Finally, the Commission established an obligation for each RTO and ISO
to establish a means for customers and other stakeholders to have a form
of direct access to the RTO or ISO board of directors, and thereby, increase
its responsiveness to customers and other stakeholders. The Commission
stated that it will assess each RTO’s or ISO’s compliance filing using four
responsiveness criteria: (1) inclusiveness; (2) fairness in balancing diverse
interests; (3) representation of minority positions; and (4) ongoing
responsiveness.
Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059,
at 61,333 (July 16, 2009) (citing Wholesale Competition I Regions with Organized Electric
Markets, FERC Stats & Regs. ¶ 31,281 (2008)).
163. Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 134
FERC ¶ 61,187, at para. 2 (Mar. 15, 2011).
164. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 216,
218 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs were a group of industry trade associations including the
American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electric Power Supply
Association, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Id.
165. Id. at 224.
166. See id. at 225.
167. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (2016).
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B. Federal Net Meter Orders and Rulings
Because net metering is considered by FERC decision to be an aspect of
retail ratemaking,168 this determination is not within federal authority, but
exclusively a state decision.169 While FERC has promulgated two decades
of generic rules and orders encouraging competitive power supply and
transmission, it can also render matter-specific adjudicatory orders which
have a similar effect to federal trial court rulings. FERC has twice adjudicated
whether state net metering programs are within state authority, or are
disguised FERC-jurisdictional wholesale sales of power. Recall that if
not a wholesale sale of power, net metering is the banking or crediting of
distributed generation on behalf of their individual distributed generation
customers.170
In 2001, FERC rejected MidAmerican Energy Company’s challenge to
Iowa’s net metering rule,171 holding that it “found no sale occurs when an
individual homeowner . . . installs generation and accounts for its dealings
with the utility through the practice of netting.”172 No net metering credits
were transferred to other customers, and the net balance of flow of power
was from the utility to the customer.173 The MidAmerican decision suggests,
but did not need to expressly reach on the facts presented, that a wholesale
sale occurs when the customer has transferred more power to the utility
through net metering than the customer has purchased from the utility “over
the course of the billing period.”174 The net metering customers in
MidAmerican were not transferring power to other customers, nor were
they making net sales to the utility over the course of the billing period.175
In 2009, another case arose before FERC, and FERC176 reiterated that
net metering practices under state regulations can be state metering banking,

168. See discussion of MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,262 (Mar.
28, 2001) and Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146 (Nov. 19, 2009), infra at Section
IV.B.
169. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769 (1982).
170. See supra Section II.A.
171. MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,261.
172. Id. at ¶ 62,263.
173. See id.
174. Id. (emphasis added). In its order, FERC also held that one month is an allowable
time interval during which the net metering process may take place. Id. at ¶ 62,264.
Previously, FERC had only permitted net metering to be measured over a one-hour
interval, though it stated that it was open to considering other time periods. Id. at ¶ 62,263.
Since the determination as to whether federal law applies focuses on whether the customer
has made a net sale at the end of the billing cycle, the allowable length of the billing cycle
is crucial. See id.
175. Id.
176. Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146, at 61,618–61,620. Sun Edison constructed,
financed, operated, and maintained solar-powered generation facilities at host sites. Sun
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and in such instances would not be wholesale power sale transactions
subject to federal jurisdiction.177 FERC held that the owner of the power
or the user of the power engaged in qualified netting of power only to the
extent that less power was sold to the grid by the renewable generator than
purchased from the grid. In Sun Edison, FERC specified that the retail
customer’s net consumption of electricity from the grid is the determinative
test: “A participant in a net metering program must be a net consumer of
electricity—but for portions of the day or portions of the billing cycle, it
may produce more electricity than it can use itself.”178
The 2009 SunEdison decision appears to place restrictions around net
metering not as a wholesale sale of power where the net flow of power
goes from the utility to the customer during a billing period. Instead,
FERC states that this net flow of power from the utility to the customer is
part of the definition of net metering eligibility: “A participant in a net
metering program must be a net consumer of electricity—but for portions
of the day or portions of the billing cycle, it may produce more electricity
than it can use itself.”179 FERC articulates the foundation of avoiding
FERC jurisdiction of wholesale sales of power:
Where there is no net sale over the billing period, the Commission has not viewed
its jurisdiction as being implicated; that is, the Commission does not assert
jurisdiction when the end-use customer that is also the owner of the generator
receives a credit against its retail power purchases from the selling utility. Only
if the end-use customer participating in the net metering program produces
more energy than it needs over the applicable billing period, and thus is
considered to have made a net sale of energy to a utility over the applicable billing
period, has the Commission asserted jurisdiction. If the entity making a net sale is
a QF [Qualifying Facility] that has been exempted from section 205 of the FPA
[Federal Power Act] by section 292.601 of our regulations, no filing under the
FPA is necessary to permit the net sale; however, if the entity is either not a QF
or is a QF that is not exempted from section 205 of the FPA by section 292.601
of our regulations, a filing under the FPA is necessary . . . .180

Edison asked FERC to confirm that subsidiaries’ sales do not constitute a wholesale sale
in interstate commerce or a transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce for
purposes of the Federal Power Act, nor involve jurisdictional rates for purposes of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act. Id.
177. Id. at ¶ 61,621.
178. Id. at ¶ 61,620. Like MidAmerican, the Sun Edison order was an adjudication
and thus limited to the particular facts of the case. FERREY, supra note 14, at 309.
179. Id. at ¶ 61,620.
180. Id. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
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FERC restates this foundation yet a third time in its Sun Edison
decision:
Because we have found that, where the end-use customer makes no net sale to
the local load-serving utility with which it has a net metering arrangement, the
sale of electric energy by SunEdison to the end-use customer in such
circumstances does not constitute a sale for resale (and also would not involve
transmission in interstate commerce), and in such circumstances the sales are not
subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under Part II of the FPA . . . .181

If one makes a “plain reading” interpretation of this FERC order, of particular
note are the adverbs and conjugations: “Only if,” “because,” “if.”
C. State and Federal Rate Precedent
As addressed subsequently,182 net metering can result in a cross-subsidization
of that current 1% of net metering customers by all customers, which is
often unknown to the other 99%. Or, on the other hand, it may not sufficiently
compensate distributed renewable power generations for their net metered
contributions to the utility grid. The function of state energy regulatory
commissions is to set rates for transactions in the retail power system.
Most states have not done this for net metering transactions. As net metering
moves forward and becomes a growing and almost universal phenomenon
in U.S. states, the exclusive role of state PUCs over net metering becomes
more critical.
1. Applicable Retail Precedent in State Law
By law, utility rates are designed to recover the cost of each commodity
and service provided. Because transactions involving utilities qualify as
a sale of an item, every consumer pays for what they consume. The retail
price of electricity is based on its reasonable cost of production through the
rate proceeding of a state energy regulatory commission. Public utility law
tracks the legal obligation to allocate costs and benefits of electricity
service in a manner that is “fair and equitable,” “not unduly preferential,”
“just and reasonable,” and “non-discriminatory” among consumers.183 The
fundamental bedrock principle of all state energy commission rate-setting
for any retail level transaction is that each group of customers pays rates
based on the actual cost of serving that group with power. This is a universal
181. Id. at ¶ 61,621 (emphasis added).
182. See infra Section V.
183. Paul Hibbard et. al., EPA’s Clean Power Plan: States’ Tools for Reducing Costs
and Increasing Benefits to Consumers, ANALYSIS GRP. 29 (July 2014), http://www.analysisgroup.
com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Analysis_Group_EPA_Clean_Power_Plan_Report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ5J-2AE4].
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rule of law within each state; Table 1 illustrates several selected state
regulatory code requirements that establish the legal requirements for setting
rates.184
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF STATE RATEMAKING PRACTICES THAT ADDRESS
CONSUMER IMPACT EQUITY AND FAIRNESS185
STATE
California

Florida

BILL OR RECENT
RATE CASE
Public Utilities Code,
Division 1, Part 1,
Chapter 4, 739.6

Florida Statute Title
XXVII

DESCRIPTION
“The commission shall
establish rates using
cost allocation
principles that fairly
and reasonably assign
to different customer
classes the costs of
providing service to
those customer classes,
consistent with the
policies of affordability
and conservation.”
“In fixing fair, just, and
reasonable rates for
each customer class,
the commission shall,
to the extent
practicable, consider
the cost of providing
service to the class, as
well as the rate history,
value of service, and
experience of the public
utility; the consumption
and load characteristics
of the various classes of

184. Id. Appendix 4 of the report contains more detailed summaries for the states
included in the case studies. Id. at 4–2.
185. Id. at 30 tbl.1.
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Illinois

Illinois Statute
220 ILCS 5/1-102

Iowa

State of Iowa to
RPU-2013-0004
(Order Issued
March 17, 2014)

Massachusetts

Rate Case OrderDocket 11-01
(August 1, 2011)

258

customers; and public
acceptance of rate
structures.”
“. . .the health, welfare
and prosperity of all
Illinois citizens require
the provision of
adequate, efficient,
reliable,
environmentally safe
and least-cost public
utility services at prices
which accurately reflect
the long-term cost of
such services and
which arc equitable to
all citizens” and that
“variation in costs by
customer class and time
of use is taken into
consideration in
authorizing rates for
each class.”
Explaining a sub-rule
related new service,
notes the provision “. . .is
designed to insure that
no customer receives
any ‘entitlement’ to
currently existing
facilities,and that all
customers pay their
appropriate share of the
utility’s cost.”
“The rate structure for
each rate class is a
function of the cost of
serving that rate class
and how rates are
designed to recover the
cost serve that rate
class. The Department
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Minnesota

Minnesota Statute
§ 216 B.03

New Mexico

NMSA 1978

North Carolina

§ 62- and § 133.8 Subs.
h-4

has determined that the
goals of designing
utility rate structures
are to achieve
efficiency and
simplicity as well as to
ensure continuity of
rates, fairness between
rate classes, and
corporate earnings
stability.”
“Every rate made,
demanded, or received by
any public utility, or by
any two or more public
utilities jointly, shall be
just and reasonable.
Rates shall not be
unreasonably
preferential,
unreasonably
prejudicial, or
discriminatory, but shall
be sufficient,equitable,
and consistent in
application to a class of
consumers.”
“Every rate made,
demanded or received
by any public utility
shall be just and
reasonable.”
“To provide just and
reasonable rates and
charges for public
utility services without
unjust discrimination,
undue preferences or
advantages. . .”
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Chapter 25, Subchapter
J, § 25.234 (effective
July 5, 1999)

“Rates shall not be
unreasonably
preferential, or
discriminatory, but
shall be sufficient,
equitable, and
consistent in
application to each
class of customers,
and shall be based on
cost.”

Each specific rate for consumers must be “just and reasonable.”186 A
nearly universal obligation imposed by federal and state laws on public
utilities is the obligation to furnish service and to charge rates that will
avoid undue or unjust discrimination among customers.187 “‘Undue’ or
‘unjust’ discrimination among customers is prohibited.”188 Policy
considerations, such as providing environmental incentives or discounting
rates to certain segments of the customer base, must play a subsidiary role
in the ultimate rate allocation among customer classes.189 These principles
are embedded in rate decisions of both FERC190 and state regulatory
commissions191 and in principles when courts review the application of
these principles by regulatory agencies.192
There is a requirement for rates to include both horizontal and vertical
equity: “The principles of horizontal equity that ‘equals should be treated
equally,’ and vertical equity that ‘unequals should be treated unequally’ . . . [is
interpreted to mean] that equal . . . cost causers for the provision of a good
or service should pay the same . . . prices.”193 Horizontal equity among
different customer classes, based on cost of service, is a goal: it is illegal

186.
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
187.
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 515 (2d ed.
1988). If an electric plant is operating near full capacity, higher charges for on-peak versus
off-peak would actually be required to avoid discrimination. Id. at 528.
188.
CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 434 (3d ed. 1993).
189.
BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 187, at 524.
190.
Ala. Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 684 F.2d 20, 21, 27 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
191.
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 460.557(3)–(4) (Lexis 2010); see also TEX. UTIL.
CODE ANN. § 36.003(a)–(c) (West 2007).
192.
Ala. Elec. Coop., 684 F.2d at 27.
193.
BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 187, at 568.
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for a state to set rates that “grant any undue preference or advantage to
any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage.”194
The rate charged to one group should not impose a cost burden derived
from a different pricing policy of another group.195 Additionally, a rate
structure should avoid undue discrimination in rate relationships, avoid
rate structures that encourage wasteful consumption, and include rates that
fairly allocate total cost.196 A public utility regulatory commission lacks
the power to approve the collection of unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory,
preferential, or prejudicial rates.197 An electric power customer only needs to
show substantial vertical disparity in rates between customers of the same
class in order to raise questions of discriminatory or preferential rates.198
When contested, the majority of legal challenges to policies of discounted
rates have been based on the equal protection clause of the applicable state
constitution.199
2. Applicable Wholesale Precedent in Federal Law
In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress supplemented the measures
that states were required to consider with a requirement that electric
utilities offer customers a “time-based rate schedule under which the rate
charged by the electric utility varies during different time periods and
reflects the variance, if any, in the utility’s costs of generating and purchasing
electricity at the wholesale level.”200 States are not required to implement
194. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b)(1) (2012).
195. BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 187, at 568.
196. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 188, at 434 (quoting BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note
187, at 291).
197. 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 32 (2013).
198. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 575 F.2d 1204,
1212 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d sub nom. City of Frankfort, Ind. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 678 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1982).
199. FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, § 10:17; see also Mountain
States Legal Found. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 590 P.2d 495, 496–98 (Colo. 1979); In re
Cent. Me. Power Co., 26 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 388, 430 (Me. 1978); Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm’n v. Phila. Elec. Co., 91 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 321, 373 (Pa. 1971).
200. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1252(a), 119 Stat. 963
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(14) (2006)). Congress also required electric
utilities to “enable the electric consumer to manage energy use and cost through advanced
metering and communications technology.” Id. This billing method would track and pass
on the higher costs during peak times to the consumer, who could then adjust his or her
consumption accordingly or adopt conservation practices to defer discretionary consumption
during high-price peak times. See Ahmad Faruqui & Sanem Sergici, Household Response

261

FERREY (DO NOT DELETE)

10/17/2018 1:16 PM

time-based rate schedules or any of the other standards listed in the Energy
Policy Act, but merely to consider them and to determine whether their
implementation is appropriate to further the purpose of the statute.201 The
cost of producing electricity varies greatly hour by hour.202 The current
rate structure in most states for residential consumers is flat, meaning
these consumers pay the same for the kilowatt-hour of electricity at any
time during the day.203
While the retail cost to the consumer stays the same under a flat-rate
structure, the cost to the utility to produce the power is dramatically time
sensitive.204 Connecticut, California, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania
have mandated real-time pricing.205 In California, utilities have experimented
with critical-peak pricing (CPP), which sets a new rate structure when
market conditions meet certain thresholds,206 yielding statewide average
reductions in electricity use of 13.1% on critical days and 4.7% on noncritical
days.207
The burden is on the applicant utility to prove that all rates are just and
reasonable.208 Under the Federal Power Act, FERC may only allow “such
rates as will prevent consumers from being charged [with] any unnecessary
or illegal costs.”209 Whenever FERC determines that a public utility’s
rates, charges, or service classifications are unjust, unreasonable, or unduly
discriminatory, FERC can determine and order rates that are just and

to Dynamic Pricing of Electricity: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence 8 (Feb. 12, 2010)
(unpublished), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134132 [https://perma.cc/
C29T-4FJ5].
201. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1252(a), (b)(i), 119 Stat. 963
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2006)).
202. See Welcome, Smart Meters. Will Smart Devices and Prices Follow?, 23 ELEC.
J. 3, 3 (Aug.–Sept. 2010).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Smart Grid Issues in State Law and Regulation, GALVIN ELEC. INITIATIVE 13 (2010),
http://galvinpower.org/sites/default/files/SmartGridIssuesInStateLawAndRegulation
_Whitepaper_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/63ZZ-USY2].
206. Karen Herter, Residential Implementation of Critical-Peak Pricing of Electricity, 35
ENERGY POL’Y 2121, 2122 (2007).
207. FARUQUI & SERGICI, supra note 200, at 18–19. The variable peak price was, on
average, $0.65 per kilowatt-hour, and the off-peak price was $0.10 per kilowatt-hour.
Peak energy-use reductions were 16% among customers who had not participated in the
prior pilot, and 27% among those who had. See id. at 20. Households that had sophisticated
end-use controls were able to cut their baseload by 41% during these critical periods;
household consumers with varied incomes and electricity demands all responded positively to
CPP by lowering their peak demand and, in turn, their monthly bills. Herter, supra note
206, at 2127–28.
208.
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d
1342, 1347, 1351 (4th Cir. 1984).
209.
NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 666 (1976).
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reasonable.210 Regulatory scrutiny ensures only that costs passed on to
retail rates are “necessary and prudent.”211
Section 205 of the Federal Power Act prohibits utilities from granting
any “undue preference or advantage to any person or . . . maintain[ing] any
unreasonable difference in rates . . . either as between localities or as between
classes of service.” 212 FERC regulations specify that it is illegal to
discriminate in rates between customers of the same class.213 Utility rates
should accurately reflect the cost of serving each customer class rather
than the individual within that class.214 There should be horizontal equity
between different customer classes and vertical equity among customers
of different amounts of electricity usage within the customer class.215
FERC regulations specify that it is illegal to discriminate in rates between
customers of the same class.216

210. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals directly answered the
issue of current “usefulness” and provided further insight into what types of canceled
investments can be included in rate bases:
[T]he Commission’s decision to authorize full recovery was just and reasonable
and consistent with Commission policy. We are unpersuaded by Norwood’s argument
that forcing ratepayers to pay for a plant no longer producing electricity conflicts
with the regulatory precept that ratepayers should only pay for items “used and
useful” in providing service. Although a utility’s rate base normally consists
only of items presently “used and useful,” a utility may include “prudent but canceled
investments” in its rate base as long as the Commission reasonably balances
consumers’ interest in fair rates against investors’ interest in “maintaining financial
integrity and access to capital markets.”
Town of Norwood v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 80 F.3d 526, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
211. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 36 F.P.C. 61, 70 (1966), aff’d sub nom.
Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 388 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1968).
212. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2012).
213. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204, 1212 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d sub
nom. City of Frankfort, Ind. v. FERC, 678 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1982); Wis. Mich. Power
Co., 31 F.P.C. 1445, 1451 (1964) (“Section 205 [of the Power Act] does not prohibit all
rate distinctions but only rate discrimination as between customers of same class.”); FERREY,
THE NEW RULES, supra note 26, at 26.
214. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 65, at 583; see also Am. Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 67 FERC ¶ 61,168, at 61,487 (May 11, 1994).
215. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 65, at 583; see also Am. Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 67 FERC ¶ 61,490 (explaining that the “focal point of claims of undue
discrimination has changed from discrimination in the treatment of different customers to
discrimination in the rates and services the utility offers third parties when compared to its
own use of the transmission system”).
216. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 575 F.2d at 1212, aff’d sub nom. City of Frankfort, 678
F.2d 699; Wis. Mich. Power Co., 31 F.P.C. at 1451 (“Section 205 [of the Power Act] does
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Non-cost-based cross-subsidies among similarly situated customers are
not allowed under most state and federal utility precedent. If state PUCs
do not specifically determine the value of net metering transactions to the
utility grid, net metering could improperly cross-subsidize one group of
consumers by imposing the total program subsidy costs on other groups
of the utility’s consumers; utilities recoup costs from required discounts
to a given class of customers through an invisible charge imposed on the
utility bills of other classes of customers.217 The rate-making allocation is a
zero-sum game: One class’s gain is the other classes’ increased costs, dollar
for dollar. Or alternatively, perhaps the value of net metering to the utility grid
is more than the retail rate. Therefore, it is critical to “follow the money,”
to determine whether the inherent subsidy for net metering should be
larger or smaller than merely affording by default the retail rate of power
for this wholesale banking service. This is the job of each of the forty-four
net metering states; and forty-two of those states have yet to do that job.
V. FOLLOW THE MONEY!
“Follow the money!”
—Deep Throat to Bob Woodward218

A. Key Stakeholder Perspectives
1. The Host Intermittent Generator
Self-generation of power is attractive for owners of distributed intermittent
generation precisely because:



It provides a free “banking” service for something which is
inherently not bankable because it has no shelf life and cannot
exist over time.219
It achieves double avoidances of regulatory imposed costs:
the generator avoids all transmission, distribution, system benefit
charge, and tax costs otherwise assessed on a kWh basis in
the retail bill for the amount of power generated.220

not prohibit all rate distinctions but only rate discrimination as between customers of same
class.”).
217. See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, § 10:17; FERREY,
THE NEW RULES, supra note 26, at 341.
218. ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN, supra note 19.
219. See supra Section III.B (discussing storage of renewable energy).
220. See Steven Ferrey, Ring-Fencing the Power Envelope of History’s Second Most
Important Invention of All Time, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 18–19
(2015).
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The avoided fractions of the utility bill collectively typically
constitute almost half of the retail bill as set forth in Figure
4.
The generator can receive, in some states, a suite of crosssubsidies in the form of Renewable Energy Credits,221 net
metering credit value, system benefit charges,222 and carbon
credits, which collectively in certain states for solar generation
can be worth up to 1000% more than the value of power
produced itself.
FIGURE 4: COMPONENTS OF THE AVERAGE RETAIL
ELECTRICITY BILL

221. Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle, supra note 11, at 84. The typical
national cost to the utility to purchase renewable portfolio standard (RPS) RECs, not
higher value solar RECs, is approximately a 40% increase in cost of the value of the
wholesale power itself, not the total cost of retail bundled cost including taxes. Author’s
calculation assuming a trading price of $20 for a state REC. For a utility in Massachusetts,
the REC purchase price is currently about equal to the wholesale cost of the power itself.
With solar RECs, in some states it is averaging 400–500% over the value of the power in
terms of the cost to utilities for solar RECs. Author’s calculations with Massachusetts
solar RECs selling in the $220–500/SREC trading range. The ACP penalty price to the
utility of not complying can be over 1000% of the value of the power involved. Author’s
calculation, comparing an ACP of $550/SREC in Massachusetts with the $50/MWh
average price of power.
222. Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle, supra note 11, at 70–71.
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This revenue flow can be seen in California, as the three investor-owned
utilities there estimate they will have to make up $1.4 billion in lost revenues,
which net metering customers no longer pay.223 The utilities in California
also estimate that if these costs were spread evenly among the 7.6 million
traditional customers, each customer would experience an average annual
increase of $185 in electricity costs for the cross-subsidy.224 The average
wholesale electricity price in California for the first half of 2013 was
$0.0424/kWh while the retail price was 16.03 cents/kWh, but the retail
price later rose to $0.1776/kWh.225 Therefore, when the utilities are crediting
solar net metering customers the full retail price, they are paying almost
400 percent more for power—which must be resold to others within a few
seconds—than they would for electricity from other sources in the
California market.226
Even if a DG customer only uses conventional power in the evenings,
the capacity of the transmission and distribution system must be sized to
deliver each customer’s peak demand flow of electricity, even if that is
only for a half-hour per day. The cost of transmission and distribution is
primarily a fixed cost, not a variable cost based on the volume or intermittency
of usage. Where a system peak on the “duck curve” occurs in the late afternoon
and early evening when there is little or no solar system production, solar
makes little contribution—lessening peak transmission and distribution
costs. Therefore, the costs for transmission and distribution services are
not that different whether a DG customer uses conventional power for a
half-hour in the evening or twenty-four hours a day.
The California Public Utility Commission report indicated a lower cost
associated with net energy metering of around $370 million per year, with
other ratepayers handling the majority of this cost allocation.227 Under
these more conservative results, net metered customers are paying 81% of

223. Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, A Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-freshthreat-do-it-yourself-power.html?_r=0.
224. Id.
225. See Electric Power Monthly Table 6.2B in U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC
POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR DECEMBER 2015 (Feb. 2016), http://eia.gov/electricity/
monthly/pdf/epm.pdf [https://perma.cc/4755-KUWZ]; Monthly Electric Utility Sales and
Revenue Report with State Distributions, in U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER
MONTHLY (2016), www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia826/xls/sales_revenue.xls.
226. Landon Stevens, California Public Utilities Commission Report on Net Metering,
INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Oct. 23, 2013), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/californiapublic-utility-commission-cpuc-report/#_ftnref4 [https://perma.cc/472B-KCL6]; CAL. PUB.
UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING RATEPAYER IMPACTS EVALUATION
(2013) [hereinafter CPUC Report], http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.
aspx?id=4292 [https://perma.cc/DV2S-GZ3D].
227. CPUC Report, supra note 226, at 6.
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their full cost of service.228 Therefore, the utilities are losing 19% of the
cost-of-service on average from each net metering customer, causing the
utilities to pass these losses in revenue requirements on to remaining nonnet metering customers.
2. Conventional Consumers
The price impact of RPS-mandated renewable energy projects has been
estimated to range between a 0.1% increase in retail rates in Maine, Maryland,
New Jersey, and New York, to up to a 1.1% retail rate increase in
Massachusetts.229 Two different reports found the cost of subsidies to wind
to be $19/MWh, or $0.019/kWh.230 In 2004, an Administrative Law Judge
of the New York Public Service Commission concluded that this renewable
portfolio standard would raise residential rates by 1.8%, commercial rates
by 2%, and industrial rates by 2.4%. It would cut statewide emissions of
NOx by 6.8%, sulfur dioxide by 5.9%, and CO2 by 7.7%.231
More recently, focusing on a single state, National Grid estimated the
cost of $3.95 per month per residential customer to pay for its customers’
share of the Massachusetts RPS program, expected to rise by $1/month
per customer by 2015.232 National Grid estimated that its net metering
costs would more than double in the second half of 2013 alone, from
$0.09/month to $0.23/month, and then more than triple again by the end of
2014 to $0.93/month.233 At the end of 2014, the other major utility in
Massachusetts, Eversource, calculated the added cost to ratepayers of net
228. Id. at 10.
229. Ryan Wiser, et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the
United States, 20 ELEC. J., 8, 16 fig.4 (May 2007) (explaining that an impact of not more
than approximately one percent is forecast to be the cost of this implementation).
230. LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS – VERSION 8.0, at 3
(Sept. 2014), https://www.lazard.com/media/1777/levelized_cost_of_energy_-_version_80.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZS7Q-5F6T]; GEORGE TAYLOR & THOMAS TANTON, AM. TRADITION
INST. CTR. FOR ENERGY STUDIES, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF WIND ELECTRICITY ES-1 (Dec.
2012), http://www.atinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Hidden-Cost.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G9CS-D7HU].
231. N.Y. ALJ Recommends Renewable Standard Reaching 25% by 2013, with Old
Hydro, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., June 7, 2004, at 7. The ruling also envisions a trading system
of renewable energy credits. Id.
232. Bruce Mohl, Green Energy Raising Concerns: Mandates Account for 5.4% of
Monthly Bill, COMMONWEALTH (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/
Voices/Back-Story/2013/Summer/004-Green-energy-costs-raising-concerns.aspx [https://perma.
cc/3TG2-KVYZ].
233. Id.
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metering and other intermittent renewable subsidies administered by utilities
pursuant to state law to be as set forth in Figure 4.234
FIGURE 5. COST IMPACT OF NET METERING AND OTHER SUBSIDIES

Utilities in California estimate that net metering may mean as much
as $1.4 billion a year in lost revenue that will have to be added to the bills of
non-net-metering customers.235 The California Public Utility Commission
reported that by 2020, net metering could cost non-solar electricity customers
$370 million to $1.1 billion per year.236 Stanford University economist
Frank Wolak calculated that the state’s renewable energy strategy could
boost electricity rates 10% to 20%, depending on a number of factors.237
“It is easily in the billions of dollars,” he said.238
California utilities advocate stricter limits on the size of net metering
units: San Diego Gas & Electric Company stated that net metering provided
an “unfair and unsustainable subsidy” of approximately $34 from each
other customer to net metering customers.239 Utilities operate as ordered

234. James Daly, Restructuring Roundtable: New England Electric Rates and Market
Drivers, NE. UTILS. 7 (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.raabassociates.org/Articles/Daly%20
Presentation%20Final%2011.21.14.pptx.
235. Cardwell, supra note 223.
236. Ker Than, supra note 95.
237. Evan Halper et al., Taxpayers, Ratepayers Will Fund California Solar Plants,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/20/local/la-me-bigsolar
20120921 [https://perma.cc/JY3Z-NXNM].
238. Id.
239. Lisa Weinzimer, Consumer and Solar Groups Pan SDG&E’s Planned Surcharge,
Saying It May Be Illegal, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 21, 2011, at 18.
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by state regulators to be the agents of this change, and in most states the
costs of these significant cross-subsidies are not revealed on the customers’
bills, as is the breakdown of the other detailed components of electricity
cost—the power commodity, transmission, distribution, stranded costs,
and other items.240 The California PUC Division of Ratepayer Advocates
criticized the rapid escalation in California ratepayer costs to achieve the
RPS mandate.241 The cost of RPS compliance exceeded the cost of the
power itself.242
Idaho sought to lower the amount paid to net-metering facilities in the
state, in order to avoid a significant cross-subsidization of one customer
group by another group of participating and non-participating net-metering
customers.243 Virginia introduced legislation to allow Dominion Virginia
Power to collect a standby charge from customers with net-metered systems
larger than 10 kW.244 There have been proposals on net-metered tariff changes
in Arizona and Georgia.245
In other countries, the feed-in tariff for renewable distributed power has
had substantial effect. Germany246 and Spain are particular examples.247
The costs in Spain, which handsomely cross-subsidizes renewable energy
generation, now pays almost 1 percent of its GDP in subsidies for renewables,
which is more than it spends on higher education.248

240. See, e.g., NSTAR monthly bill (on file with author).
241. Geoffrey Craig, Renewable Costs of California’s Three Big Utilities Soared
Last Year, CPUC Data Shows, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 13, 2012, at 18.
242. Id.
243.
Idaho Power Co.’s Application for Authority To Modify Its Net Metering
Service and to Increase the Generation Capacity Limit, Case No. IPC-E-12-27, Order No.
32767 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm’n Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.puc.idaho.gov/fileroom/
cases/elec/IPC/IPCE1227/ordnotc/20130325NOTICE_OF_SCHEDULE_ORDER_NO_
32767.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JA8-M5HV].
244. Net Metering – An Overview of Virginia’s Regulatory Policy, DSIRE, http://programs.
dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/40 [https://perma.cc/HY5S-Y6YJ] (last updated Dec.
1, 2015).
245. See Standby & Fixed Cost Charges and Net Energy Metering Debates: Current
Status, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. (Aug. 2014), http://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp
content/uploads/State-Status-of-NEM-Standby-+-Fixed-Cost-Charge-Debates_V2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5J5-9KNL].
246. See Melissa Eddy, German Energy Push Runs into Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/business/energy-environment/german
energy-push-runs-into-problems.html.
247. Davies & Allen, supra note 108, at 940.
248. See id. at 975.
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Consumers typically are charged for electric service as a function of the
quantity of power purchased rather than based on fixed costs for a set
package or use of services. NRG Energy noted that more distributed solar
and wind power forces utilities to spread their increasing fixed costs over
fewer customers, therefore increasing the cost of service to remaining
customers.249 When fixed utility grid costs are allocated to a smaller
volume of sales, costs for those consumers remaining in service increases
retail electricity costs per unit of service.250
State utility regulators could easily determine and set the actual value
of net metering to the utility system—few states have. Any generation
arrangement which provides a benefit to the utility system should fairly
compensate users so that the generator can internalize its benefits. This is
a fundamental principle of state utility law.251 Every state is required to
assess the value of intermittent distributed generation and set rates for net
metering accordingly. Only two states have done so. It is not the purpose
of this Article to determine whether in each of the forty-four net metering
states, net metering customers are compensated too little or too much;
what is clear is that setting the net metered rate at the wholesale rate avoids
the required legal determination.
B. “Raising Arizona”252
Arizona, the state with perhaps the most consistent access to solar
radiation, is an interesting example of how different in-state utilities and
state regulatory commissions address distributed generation and net
metering. Three utilities in Arizona have different policy perspectives,
and the legal accommodation among various stakeholders is still evolving.
Arizona provides one laboratory for the energy future.
1. APS
In Arizona, the Arizona Corporation Commission voted to allow the
state’s largest utility, Arizona Public Service (APS), to add an additional
249. Andrew Engblom, NRG CEO: Distributed Generation a ‘Mortal Threat’ to
Utilities, SNL (Mar. 22, 2013, 10:21 AM), https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/article.aspx?
CDID=A-17263021-14130&KPLT=4 [https://perma.cc/BAU7-THEQ].
250. Jeff McMahon, Steven Chu Solves Utility Companies’ Death Spiral, FORBES (Mar.
21, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2014/03/21/steven-chu-solves
utility-companies-death-spiral/; see also Herman K. Trabish, California PUC President: The
Utility Death Spiral is ‘Last Year’s Hype’, G REENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 29, 2014), http://
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-Utility-Death-Spiral-is-Last-Years-Hype-CaliforniaPUC-President [https://perma.cc/6YDB-443W].
251. See supra Section IV.A.
252. RAISING ARIZONA (20th Century Fox 1987).
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fee of about $5 a month on to the bills of customers with new solar
installations.253 This modest amount is only 10% of the $50 monthly
surcharge APS originally sought.254 APS believes that this will help relieve
some of the cost burden shifted to non-net metering customers from net
metering customers—which APS calculates as approximately $1,000 per
residential net metering system per year, with total annual costs shifting
to non-net metering customers of approximately $18 million.255
APS requested to collect fees for DG system losses in bills.256 APS
claimed that for every 7,800 DG systems installed, a permanent cost shift
between the DG “haves” and DG “have-nots” of approximately $126 million
over a 20-year period is created.257 The utility also estimates that if the
current pace of installations continues through mid-2017, close to $800
million in fixed costs will be shifted to and paid by customers without
DG.258
The utility calculates that under the current rate design, customers net
metering DG avoid paying approximately $804 of the fixed pro rata
system costs each year, or $67 per month, shifted to and ultimately paid
by customers without DG.259 The Commission staff then proposed a residual
charge to net metering customers ranging from $3.08/kW to $12/kW per
month of DG installed.260 Although the Commission found that $3/kW
per month—or $12 for a customer system of 4 kW—was a reasonable

253. Diane Cardwell, Compromise in Arizona Defers a Solar Power Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/business/energy-environment/
compromise-in-arizona-defers-a-solar-power-fight.html?_r=0.
254. Id.
255. Memorandum Proposed Order from the Utilities Division at 2, In the Matter of
the Application of Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Sol. (Sept.
30, 2013) (No. E-01345A-13-0248), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000148646.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JAQ5-LPJE].
256. Motion to Reset at 2, 10, In the Matter of the Application of Ariz. Pub. Serv.
Co. for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Sol. (Apr. 2, 2015) (No. E-01345A-13-0248),
http://www.azenergyfuture.com/getmedia/731941dd-3dbb-4510-ad9c-cf67ed5b3bda/GridAccess-Charge-Motion-to-Reset_Docket.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU86-AS5B]. In late 2013,
the Commission began addressing the fact that customers with DG were not paying their
fair share for the use of the grid, by ordering customers who install rooftop solar to pay
$.70 per month for each kW of their solar system. Id. at 1.
257. Id. at 2.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 3.
260. Id. at 4 (citing Decision No. 74202 at paras. 63–72, In the Matter of the
Application of Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Sol. (Dec. 3,
2013) (No. E-01345A-13-0248)).
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amount to charge, it instead set a lower $0.70/kW adjustment—or $2.80 per
month for a 4 kW system.261
Notwithstanding the fee, in 2014, approximately 7,800 DG systems
were installed in APS’s service territory,262 with applications increasing
at an increasing rate.263 The increase in installations also constitutes a
$6.3 million cost shift to those without net metering, which over the 20
year life of DG systems from only the DG installed in the single year of
2014 is approximately $126 million.264 APS requested that the cost adjustment
value be reset to $3/kW.265 APS’s solar customers also have an option to
enroll in the Combined Advantage rate plan which affords time-of-use
pricing with a demand charge.266
2. TEP
Tucson Electric Power Company (“TEP”) submitted an application to
the Arizona Corporate Commission for approval of a new net-metering
tariff for future net metering customers that provides monthly bill credits
for any excess energy produced from an eligible net metering facility at a
“Renewable Credit Rate,”267 and approval of a partial waiver of the

261. Id. at 4–5 (citing Decision No. 74202 at 85, In the Matter of the Application of
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Sol. (Dec. 3, 2013) (No. E
01345A-13-0248)). See also History of Solar Issue, ARIZ. PUB. SERV., http://www.azenergy
future.com/access-charge/history-of-solar-issue [https://perma.cc/H4PA-44Q3] (last visited
June 2, 2016).
262. Motion to Reset, supra note 256, at 6.
263. Rooftop Solar Applications Up 112% in First Quarter 2015, ARIZ. PUB. SERV.
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.azenergyfuture.com/blog/april-2015/rooftop-solar-applications
-up-112-in-first-quarte [https://perma.cc/GAW4-MYVR].
264. Motion to Reset, supra note 256, at 6.
265. APS Asks to Reset Grid Access Charge for Future Solar Customers, ARIZ. PUB.
SERV. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.azenergyfuture.com/blog/april-2015/aps-asks-to-reset
grid-access-charge-for-future-so [https://perma.cc/BX62-SGXL].
266. Combined Advantage 7 PM–Noon Plan, ARIZ. PUB. SERV., http://www.aps.com/
en/residential/accountservices/serviceplans/Pages/combined-advantage.aspx [https://perma.cc/
XCY3-UFYB] (last visited June 2, 2016). During the winter—November–April billing
cycles—the on-peak kWh charge is $0.05747, the off-peak kWh is $0.04107, and the
demand charge per kW is $9.30. Id. During the summer—May–October billing cycles—
the on-peak kWh is $0.08867, the off-peak kWh is $0.04417, while the demand charge
per kW is $13.50. Id. The time-of-day rate helps solar units, which generate power during
the on-peak afternoon times when demand and prices for power are highest. Furthermore,
customers who add solar and enroll in this rate plan are not subject to the grid access charge.
Arizona’s Energy Future, ARIZ. PUB. SERV. (June 5, 2015), http://www.solartopps.com/
aps-grid-access-charge.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD3T-MJEQ].
267. The Proposed “Renewable Credit Rate” is the rate equivalent to the most recent
utility scale renewable energy purchased power agreement connected to the Company’s
distribution system. The current Renewable Credit Rate would be $0.0584/kWh. The rate
would apply to future DG Customers that qualify for the Commission’s Net Metering
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Commission’s net metering rules.268 The output from DG systems in TEP’s
service area already far exceeds the state requirement for renewable
generation.269 The utility claimed that it has suffered a substantial rise in
unrecovered fixed costs due to lost distribution system revenues through
net metering.270 Under the Company’s current rate design, DG Customers
do not pay for a pro rata share of the fixed distribution system costs that
TEP incurs to serve them because a large portion of those costs are recovered
through volumetric kWh charges.271
TEP claimed that the average fixed cost of providing any electric services
to any residential customer was $55 per month, even if the customer
purchased no net amount of power.272 The only fixed non-volumetric
portion of the residential customer’s bill is the $10 monthly customer
charge, which only recovers about 18% of TEP’s fixed distribution system
costs to serve residential customers.273 TEP, like most utilities, relies

Rules. In the Matter of Tucson Electric Power Company, Inc. for (1) Approval of a Net
Metering Tariff and (2) Partial Waiver of the Net Metering Rules, at 1 (Mar. 25, 2012)
[hereinafter Application] (No. E-01933A-15-0100), https://www.tep.com/doc/renewable/
TEP_ACC_Application_032015.pdf [https://perma.cc/64G8-G3FY]. Most of Arizona’s
electric utilities, including TEP, have now reduced or eliminated separate upfront
cash incentives for solar DG systems. Id. at 4.
268. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE. §§ R14-2-2301 et seq. (2013); see Application, supra note
267, at 1. The utility contends that approximately 7,900 of its residential customers have
rooftop PV systems, and that it has received 600 applications in the first two and a half
months of 2015. Id. at 3.
269. Application, supra note 267, at 4. In 2015, The RES DG requirement for TEP
is approximately 138,000 MWh, and the utility projects that in 2015 total generation from
residential and non-residential DG systems will exceed the RES DG requirement by
approximately 70% and will meet the RES DG requirement through 2017. Id.; In the
Matter of the Application of Tucson Electric Power Company for Approval of its 2015
Renewable Energy Standard Implementation Plan at Ex. 5 (July 1, 2014) (No. E-019331
14-0248), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000154472.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J5NB-SHJB] (showing TEP’s projected 2015 DG output of 229,894 MWh).
270. Application, supra note 267, at 5.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.; see also Testimony of Craig Jones at 33, In the Matter of the Application
of Tucson Electric Power Company for the Establishment of Just and Reasonable Rates
and Charges Designed to Realize a Reasonable Rate of Return on the Fair Value of its
Operations Throughout the State Arizona (July 2, 2012) (No. 01933A-12-0291). The
customer charge is traditionally set at a level sufficient to cover the monthly meter reading,
billing and bill collection costs of a customer. Id. at 29.
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predominately on volumetric sales and its inclining block rate design to
recover the remaining 82% of its fixed distribution system costs.274
In 2015, because of net metered power, TEP is expected to recover
approximately only $2.2 million, or just 40% of fixed system costs, that
were not recovered from DG customers in 2014.275 Because utilities are
allowed to recover their operating costs, the rest of these costs are shifted
to all other customers on a volumetric basis, generally with no itemization
of the cause of these higher rates on customer bills to identify this cost shift.
The utility contends that DG systems added since TEP’s last test year rate
order, through the end of 2014, result in approximately $7 million in
annual subsidies that will be shifted to and paid by non-DG customers.276
TEP requested approval of a new net metering tariff where new DG
customers would pay the currently applicable retail rate for all energy
delivered by TEP, and receive compensation for any excess energy their
systems produce and deliver to TEP with bill credits calculated using the
Renewable Credit Rate, with credit carry-over to future months.277 This
would change the conventional net metering protocol so that customers
receive the same wholesale price the utility pays to large solar arrays for
wholesale solar output, instead of credits at the much higher retail rate.
This plan would see a typical customer with rooftop solar pay an increased
fee of about $22 per month.278
The utility argues that this is more equitable because customers who
generate their own energy with solar panels rely on the company’s
electrical system just as much as non-DG customers.279 A TEP residential
customer without solar panels pays an average of $117.60 per month in
electric bills, while a typical net metered solar energy customer pays $15
per month.280 The new proposal would increase this net metered figure
from $15 per month to $37 per month, which is still less that the utility’s

274. Application, supra note 267, at 5.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 5–6. For TEP in Arizona, a portion of the lost fixed costs from net metering
care shifted to non-DG conventional customers through its Lost Fixed Cost Recovery
Mechanism (LCFR). This system charge collects some of TEP’s fixed system costs that
go unrecovered when energy usage is reduced by Commission-mandated energy efficiency and
DG programs. Id.
277. Id. at 7. Pre-existing DG customers prior to the alteration would continue to
receive a full retail rate offset for the energy they self-consumer from their DG systems.
Id.
278. Tony Davis, TEP Would Slice Rooftop Solar Rate Benefits, ARIZ. DAILY STAR
(Mar. 25, 2015, 7:09 PM), http://tucson.com/business/tep-would-slice-rooftop-solar-rate
benefits/article_a3768767-0af7-5fa4-9a45-2cbb65de3c77.html [https://perma.cc/9UEM
MLW6].
279. Id.
280. Id.
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calculation of the monthly per customer share of maintaining the grid on
an average pro rata basis.281
3. SRP
Discretion to change rates with a co-op, as opposed to an investorowned utility, is self-determined. An Arizona co-op utility named Salt
River Project, which is not subject to the same state regulatory oversight
as are investor-owned utilities, notes that typical customers who installed
solar had an average bill of about $170 per month before installation and,
under the old price structure, their average bill dropped to about $70 per
month with solar.282 However, the utility’s avoided costs, largely for fuel,
fell only about $50 per month, leaving it with a monthly net revenue loss
of $50 per average solar customer.283 The utility’s internal analysis showed
73% of its costs are fixed, while solar owners’ reduced variable kWh
charges are significantly lower than their contribution to maintenance of
system infrastructure, without proportionately reducing their consumption
of peak demand electricity.284
The SRP co-op voted to increase electric rates and approved a
controversial adder charged on rooftop solar unit owners. Customers who
filed to have new PV units after December 8, 2014, will see monthly bills
rise about $50 from new “demand charges” based on their peak power
usage during the month.285 New customers would see a decrease in their
bills from $170 per month to $120 per month.286 SolarCity Corporation
sued Salt River Project alleging that its new pricing policy will “punish
customers who choose to go solar” under a plan which imposes fees on

281. Id.
282. Herman K. Trabish, Why SRP’s Controversial Demand Charge Unlocks a Huge
Opportunity for Solar-Plus-Storage, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/
news/why-srps-controversial-demand-charge-unlocks-a-huge-opportunity-for-solar-/372548
[https://perma.cc/FXH2-NM57].
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Gavin Bade, SRP Board Vote to Increase Charges on Solar Owners, UTIL. DIVE
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/srp-board-votes-to-increase-charges
on-solar-owners/369377 [https://perma.cc/U3PE-W5WQ]. SRP will get its cost recovery
from a demand charge that rises with peak period usage. Id.
286. Id. However, if DG customers respond to the price signal efficiently, they might
save more than $100 per month by adopting new technology such as load controllers, smart
thermostats, or battery technology. See Trabish, supra note 282.
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customer self-generation.287 Solar City alleged anti-competitive behavior
in a March 2015 lawsuit in an attempt to block a base fee imposed on net
metering customers.288
C. Minnesota
Minnesota legislated alternatives.289 The true wholesale value of distributed
generation for the system is real, but is not a value equal to the unrelated
retail rate. Minnesota passed legislation in 2013, which allows InvestorOwned Utilities (IOUs) to apply to the PUC for a Value of Solar (VOS)
tariff.290 The calculation must take into account the following values of
distributed photovoltaics: energy and delivery; generation capacity;
transmission capacity; transmission and distribution line losses; and
environmental value. Notably, however, it does not in any way value the
added financial and environmental cost to the system to operate additional
fast-start or spinning reserves to accommodate the intermittent supply of
intermittent solar power. Studies in every state omit this critical consideration
of back-up ramping costs to the electric system.
VI. MOVING FORWARD
A. Power Equity
California is moving very slowly in a similar direction as Minnesota to
assess the value of solar. California has the most ambitious state renewable
energy program, designed to reach 30% of all in-state power generation
by 2020. The California net-metering program was called into question
in California by San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E), which claimed
that it acts as an unnecessary subsidy for on-site renewable energy
generation.291
The California Public Utility Commission’s net metering report provided
evidence demonstrating most homeowners who have solar systems are
287. Justin Doom, Arizona Utility’s Fee Will Hurt Customers Who Choose Solar
Power, Solarcity Alleges, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (Mar. 3, 2015) (The
new fees “add up to hundreds of dollars per year, and make a competitive rooftop solar
business impossible within SRP territory”). New applications have plunged 96 percent since
December. Id.
288. Id.
289. See generally DIV. ENERGY RES., MINN. DEP’T COMMERCE, MINNESOTA VALUE
OF SOLAR: METHODOLOGY (Apr. 1, 2014), http://mn.gov/commerce-stat/pdfs/vos-methodology.
pdf [https://perma.cc/V48B-GQCQ].
290. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (2015).
291. See Susannah Churchill, CA Utilities Want to Replace Net Metering With . . .
What?, VOTE SOLAR (Aug. 13, 2015), http://votesolar.org/2015/08/13/ca-utilities-want-to
replace-net-metering-with-what [https://perma.cc/K4ZU-JHEC].
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high energy users with an average household income of $91,000—well
above California’s state average of $54,000.292 The average median household
income of net energy metering customers in California is 68 percent higher
than that of the average household in the state.293 An analysis by the
Center for American Progress concluded that in Arizona, California, and
New Jersey, rooftop solar installations are overwhelmingly occurring in
middle-class neighborhoods that have median incomes from $40,000 to
$90,000.294 As with any expensive new technology, this pattern of adoption
is not startling.
Others are raising issues of energy equity. Observers conclude that the
“capacity of solar DG[] imposes cross-subsidies on non-solar residential
customers, and is socially regressive because it effectively transfers wealth
from less affluent to more affluent consumers.”295 If it does so, this is
because it shifts a larger share of fixed grid system costs discussed above296
through non-by passable fixed charges on customers who remain on the
system for 100% of their power consumption without DG, consequently
imposing more of a burden on low-income households without DG.297
This shift of costs also dilutes price signals for energy efficiency.298
Every state’s legal precedent requires horizontal and vertical equity in
the establishment of rates, which applies equally to rates for net metering
or energy banking services. Very few state energy regulatory commissions,
who must establish non-discriminatory cost-based rates, have applied any
cost analysis when they establish their wholesale transaction net metering
rates at whatever their retail rates are and let the meters turn in reverse
direction. There are costs in using the grid to send power in any direction.
Despite forty-four states implementing net metering as the most pervasive
DG and renewable energy subsidy in America, and net metering having

292. CPUC Report, supra note 226, at 11.
293. Ashley Brown & Jillian Bunyan, Valuation of Distributed Solar: A Qualitative
View, 27 ELEC. J. 27, 47 (Dec. 2014) (citing California Net Metering Draft Cost-Effectiveness
Evaluation, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N (Sept. 26, 2013), www.ethree.com/documents/
CSI/CPUC_NEM_Draft_Report_9-26-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL3N-YL9C]).
294. Mari Hernandez, Solar Power to the People: The Rise of Rooftop Solar Among
the Middle Class, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/green/report/2013/10/21/76013/solar-power-to-the-people-the-rise-of-rooftop-solaramong-the-middle-class [https://perma.cc/C9PJ-WSND].
295. Brown & Bunyan, supra note 293.
296. See supra Sections II.B and V.A.2.
297. CPUC Report, supra note 226, at 53–57.
298. Id.
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existed for more than two decades, only Minnesota and Maine have done
so to date.299
The California Commission is now venturing in this direction.300
Arbitrarily chosen net metering at unrelated retail rates in one direction or
the other creates a cross-subsidy, which violates a bedrock principle
of regulation: Costs should be allocated to the cost causer.301 The California
commission found that net-metered generation currently results in a net
cost of between $79 million and $252 million, with the additional net costs
subsidized by other ratepayers—those not participating in the net-metering
program. The commission calculated that such costs would reach between
$370 million and $1 billion per year by 2020 under existing DG build-out
goals.
The commission commented that the study also indicated that netmetering customers “appear to be paying slightly more than their full cost
of service.”302 If this proves to be true over time, the cross-subsidy to net
metering customers should increase. Although of note in reaching this
result, California has not assessed the system ramping costs, the consequent
increase in environmental pollution from additional ramping, or the energy
storage costs to those DG customers whose generation causes these costs.
B. California Mitigation Through Rate Structure
California utility regulators are considering overhauling how most residential
customers pay for power by switching to rates that change based on what
time of day customers consume electricity.303 The proposed changes, which
also includes a plan to eventually start charging customers $10 per month
to cover the basic costs of service, will prove controversial.304 The three
California utilities now employ a four-tier rate structure in which customers
using the most electricity pay an average of $0.34/kWh, more than double
the $0.14/kWh average rate for residential consumers that consume less
electricity.305
Assembly Bill No. 327 modifies the utility rate structures for residential
users, allows utilities to flatten the higher prices per kilowatt-hour that

299. See supra Section V.C.
300. See supra Sections V.A.1., V.A.2.; infra Section VI.B.
301. Brown & Bunyan, supra note 293, at 32.
302. Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures and Rules for the
California Solar Initiative, the Self-Generation Incentive Program and Other Distributed
Generation Issues, Decision 14-03-041, at 7 (Cal. P.U.C. Mar. 27, 2014) (No. 12-11-005).
303. California May Adopt Time-Of-Use Electric Rates, ARGUS (Apr. 23, 2015, 5:49
PM), http://www.argusmedia.com/News/Article?id=1027978 [https://perma.cc/UH43-BHG4].
304. Id.
305. Id.
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heavy residential power users pay for marginal amounts of electricity, and
allows the utilities to potentially charge flat monthly fees to all residential
customers. Flattening the rate structure lowers high-end final inclining
block rate costs that could be net metered for rooftop solar residents. The
current system ranges from approximately $0.13–0.33/kWh at different
tiers, with spikes in past years reaching highs of $0.50/kWh.306
If inclining rates were flatter, some of the cross-subsidy of net metered
power would move away from distributed generation. The bill also allows
utilities to impose flat monthly fees on utility bills to offset fixed operational
costs, at a cap of $10 per month.307 The mathematical calculation may not
be as time-consuming as the politics of change; the process is not immediate.
The California legislature directed the state’s PUC to come up with a new
program by 2017 that ensures non-solar customers are not unfairly burdened
paying for the grid.308
Using time-of-use rates as the default option for residential consumers
could produce long-term savings by creating a stiff economic incentive to
shift electricity use away from times of high day-time demand.309 The
state utilities already use time-of-use rates as the default for industrial and
commercial customers. California ratepayer advocates project time-of
use rates would result in 2,300 MW of peak load reduction.310 Some
scholars project that the time-of-use rates could make the state’s load
curve more manageable, perhaps reshaping the back of the “duck curve”
in Figure 2.311

306. Jeff St. John, AB327: The Dark Side for California Solar, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ab-327-the-dark-side-for
california-solar [https://perma.cc/4PS7-QH5X].
307. Chris Meehan, Energy Bill in California Gets a Rooftop Solar-Friendly Makeover,
SOLAR REVS. (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.solarreviews.com/news/California-bill-gets
rooftop-solar-friendly-090413 [https://perma.cc/V63W-9S6V].
308. Ker Than, supra note 95.
309. Id.; Proposed Decision of ALJS McKinney & Halligan at 2–3, Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm’n Decision on Residential Rate Reform For Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., S. Cal. Edison
Co., and San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. and Transition to Time-of-Use Rates (Apr. 4, 2015)
(No. 12-06-013) [hereinafter Proposed Decision], http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/
Efile/G000/M151/K305/151305677.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3EF-A387].
310. Opening Testimony of Office of Ratepayer Advocates On 2015 Rates and
Beyond at 1–3 n.5, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (Sept. 15, 2015) (No. R.12-06-013).
311. Ker Than, supra note 95; Press Release, Cal. Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n,
California Public Utilities Commission Adopts New Rooftop Solar Program (Jan. 28,
2016), http://calseia.org/press-releases/2016/1/28/california-public-utilities-commission
adopts-new-rooftop-solar-program.
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The proposed California rate decision would also cut in half the number
of different rate tiers based on amount of consumption, switching to a twotier system with a 20% price differential.312 This proposal would keep an
incentive to conserve power, but would attempt to address the equity issue
for non-net-metering customers who now cross-subsidize low-use customers
under steeper rate differentials.313 The fixed charge was delayed, but a
minimum bill of $10 per month was instituted.314
C. Un-Net-Metering “Flips”
Some utilities are proposing to flip the concept of net metering. To do
so, the meter is the message: The side of the meter on which solar PV
panels are placed determines whether the power is net-metered by the
customer or the generator—or alternatively is owned by the utility and sold
conventionally. This can even include solar units placed on a customer’s
roof, depending on where the utility meter is placed. There is a tension here
between engineering of power and the law of power.
Arizona Public Service in 2014 filed a plan called AZ Sun DG under which
APS would lease conventional residential consumer rooftops for mounting
of its owned PV generation units.315 Under a twenty-year conventional
lease, APS would pay homeowners $30 per month to be set off as a billing
credit for use of the roof to install and own a cumulative 20 MW of PV
units on 3,000 customer homes.316 APS would incur the capital, installation,
and maintenance costs, which on a cumulative basis for the first phase
would be approximately $57–$70 million for 3,000 homes with units of size
4–8 kW, at a cost ranging from $19,000 to $24,350 per home, representing
a marginal cost of $3,000–$5,000/kW installed.317
The installations would be on the utility side of the meter, as a utilityowned generation project, with APS owning the PV panels and the power
output. All power would be sold to customers on the grid at regulated retail
rates.318 From the perspective of the homeowner, the home customer would

312. Proposed Decision, supra note 309, at 101–03, 284.
313. Id. at 109.
314. Id. at 202; Jeff Stanfield, California PUC ALJ Proposal Would Lower Rates for
Larger Residential Electric Consumers, GREENLINING INST. (May 4, 2015), http://greenlining.
org/issues/2015/california-puc-alj-proposal-would-lower-rates-for-larger-residential
electric-consumers [https://perma.cc/L6U4-LUW4].
315. Bruce W. Radford, Rent the Rooftop: A New Front Opens in the Solar Wars,
PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY (Aug. 2014), http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2014/08/rentrooftop#sthash.kJNGCRsO.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFE2-QS4N].
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. (This differs from the so-called “Buy All, Sell All” business model where
the utility buys the customer-owned output at the lower wholesale rate and sells back the
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receive $360 per year, or more than $4,000 over twenty years, for outlaying
no capital, which is equivalent to approximately a 50% reduction in the
cost of electric service.
From the perspective of the utility, with a typical 5–6 kW PV array,
APS might generate 8,000 kWh of electricity per year, which would have
a retail value of approximately $4,000 per year in wholesale value and
more than twice this in retail value. There was vocal criticism.319 This is
not distributed generation and there is a question about whether a utility
should not earn a return on equipment installed on the customers’ residences
and included in its rate base. Utilities across the country have been encouraged
to expend and expense the cost of energy efficiency investments in customer
residences and businesses. Arizona in late 2013 imposed an additional fee of
approximately $4.90 per month on solar installations.320
Certain utilities are going into solar as a separate unregulated business
venture. Dominion Energy announced it is divesting its retail business
and will focus on a 250 MW solar development target by 2016.321 In 2014,
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Edison Electric
Industry, an electric utility industry trade group, jointly called for a new
state retail rate structure to reflect more equitable prices based on actual
costs and benefits for distributed renewable energy systems.322 According

power to customers at the higher retail rate, thus still collecting any payment for
transmission and distribution).
319. Ken Johnson of the Solar Energy Industries Association stated:
In a move condemned by many solar companies in Arizona, the state’s largest
utility, APS, has announced that it will begin installing rooftop solar on customers’
homes. After attacking rooftop solar companies in Arizona relentlessly for more
than a year, this latest tactic by APS has a “Trojan Horse” smell to it. Our member
companies welcome fair and equal competition, but this move would stack the
deck in favor of a company which can rate base solar with a guaranteed rate of
return. How is that fair? The Arizona Corporation Commission needs to think
this through very carefully.
Id.
320. See N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., STANDBY & FIXED COST CHARGES AND NET
ENERGY METERING DEBATES: CURRENT STATUS 1 (Aug. 2014), http://ncclean tech.ncsu.
edu/wp-content/uploads/State-Status-of-NEM-Standby-+-Fixed-Cost-Charge-Debates_V2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/29J6-HUQB] (New net-metered rooftop solar systems are charged about
$4.90 per month as of January 2014).
321. Zacks Equity Research, Dominion Multiplies Solar Projects, ZACKS INV. RES.
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/128536/Dominion-Multiplies-SolarProjects [https://perma.cc/7NS2-D86Y].
322. EEI/NRDC Joint Statement To State Utility Regulators, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL
(Feb. 12, 2014), http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_14021101a.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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to the Executive Director of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, net energy
metering “was simply never a conscious policy decision. It is basically a
default product of two (no longer relevant) considerations, one practical
and the other technological. The practical reason is that residential distributed
generation had such an insignificant presence in the market that its economic
impact was marginal at best.”323
Governor Baker proposed a change to Massachusetts’ net metering program
after he took office in 2015.324 Massachusetts has the most far-reaching
net metering program of all the forty-four states.325 He proposed differentiating
how net metering would be treated before or after the state achieved its
solar energy target.326 Former Governor Patrick had established a 250 MW
target by 2017 and a 400 MW solar target to be achieved by 2020.327
When that target was achieved in just three years and then much surpassed,
Governor Patrick and the Democratically controlled legislature decided to
quadruple the target to 1600 MW of solar and successively raise the caps
on the amount of net metering allowed for net metering from its original
1% of each utility’s peak load successively until it was 9% of peak load,
divided between a private and public credit off-taker subset.328
The affected state utilities and Associated Industries of Massachusetts
argued that the lost revenue from this most permissive net metering program
in the country was being invisibly added to the bills of all retail consumers
as an increased distribution charge, when as a generation component it
had nothing to do with the “distribution” of power to these consumers.329
The state Department of Public Utilities never made any quantification of

9DLC-YR7K]; Christopher Martin, NRDC, Utility Group Urge Grid Payments, New Rate
Structure for Rooftop Solar Users, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2014-02-12/nrdc-and-u-s-utilities-seek-compensation-for-rooftop-solar-cost.html
[https://perma.cc/L8A8-9PP9].
323. Brown & Bunyan, supra note 293, at 31.
324. See Steve LeBlanc, Governor Baker Files Bill to Encourage Expansion of Solar
Power, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 8, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/08/07/
gov-baker-files-bill-encourage-expansion-solar-power/BbRpLzFy3PBZ2SlUyjGgPP/story.html.
325. See supra Section II.A.
326. LeBlanc, supra note 324; H. 3724, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2015), https://male
gislature.gov/Bills/189/House/H3724 [https://perma.cc/VB2W-XRTP].
327. FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, at § 10:115.10; MASS.
DEP’T ENERGY RES., MA RPS SOLAR CARVE-OUT PRICE SUPPORT MECHANISM: PROGRAM
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS DOCUMENT 1–4 (Oct. 23, 2009).
328. FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, at § 10:115.10
329. Martin LaMonica, Cape Wind Agrees to Reduce Cost of Offshore Wind, CNET
(Aug. 2, 2010, 7:22 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/cape-wind-agrees-to-reduce-cost
of-offshore-wind [https://perma.cc/6HV8-WWJL]; Letter from Robert Rio, Senior Vice
President & Counsel for Associated Indus. of Mass., to Susan Leavitt, Dep’t of Energy
Res. (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/aim-robert
rio.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TBJ-KDTX].
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the value of solar projects to the system supported by the other 99% of
retail customers who did not have solar projects.330 Net metering had been
compensated at near the full retail rate for most customers.331
Most importantly, the state utility regulatory agency would be empowered
to create a fair tariff for net metering transactions.332 This is a critical
element. This legislatively established discretion parallels the types of
recommendations in this Article. In the Massachusetts’ Governor’s proposal,
solar units of residential and small commercial size are not affected in the
net metering credit value that they receive either before or after the target
amount of solar is achieved. Larger units only receive the current near
retail rate credit value if they are built before the 1600 MW target is
saturated.333 For thereafter additional newly constructed units larger than
10 kW single phase or 25 kW three-phase, their net metering credit value
is decreased after the installation target is satisfied.334
The net metering caps, which had been filled repeatedly, are expanded
again for additional net metering units by the Baker proposed legislation:
For private customers the percentage shall not exceed 6% of the distribution
company’s peak load; and the net metering capacity of net metering facilities
of a municipality or other governmental entity shall not exceed 7 percent
of the distribution company’s peak load.335
Governor Baker’s proposed legislation would utilize differentiated
rates, after the state target of 1600 MW of solar was met, thereafter not to
afford additional net metering units the full retail rate for a service that is
more akin to a wholesale trading transaction.336
Within the these larger state caps, after the 1600 MW installed solar capacity
target is reached, the generous—near retail value—net metering credits
are replaced by credits at a reduced market-based value for only additional
new units constructed thereafter. This places a premium for early entrants:
Market-based net metering credit, a credit equal to the excess kilowatt-hours by
time of use billing period, if applicable, multiplied by the average monthly energy
clearing price in the ISO-NE zone in which the net metering facility is located;
provided, however, (i) net metering facilities of a municipality or other governmental
entity, (ii) eligible recipients of credits from net metering facilities serving low
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See supra Section II.A.
Id.
H. 3724, 189th Gen. Court. (Mass. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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income customers as such customers are defined by the department of energy
resources pursuant to section 11J of chapter 25A, and (iii) eligible recipients of
credits from community shared net metering, as defined by the department of
energy resources pursuant to section 11J of chapter 25A, shall receive a credit
equal to the basic service kilowatt-hour charge in the ISO-NE load zone where
the customer is located.337

The market rate for power is the wholesale market rate established by
competition, which rates trades at much less than the full retail rate—the
majority of which can be extra costs for transmission, distribution, and
taxes—and noticeably less than the retail cost of the commodity sold to
customers. The monthly energy price is the time-weighted wholesale price,
or equivalent to “avoided cost.”338 Conversely, government agencies, lowincome customers, and community net metering receive the basic service
retail component.339 Approximately 40% of the total retail charge is comprised
of the charge for the actual power commodity—the “basic service” designated
under Massachusetts regulation. For example, while the entire retail rate in
Massachusetts might be $0.16–0.25/kWh based on different rate classes,
the “basic service” electricity commodity charge was approximately $0.09/
kWh. At the same point, the market-based wholesale cost of power was
approximately $0.055/kWh. The regular net metering value, prior to when
the target amount of net metering is installed, is much more.340
These proposed legislative changes apply time as a variable: Earlier
entrants receive a higher net metering credit value for the identical net
metering of later constructed units after the state quantity target is achieved.
After the state target is realized, the value of additional net metering units
depreciates:



Smaller units of typical rooftop size continue indefinitely to
realize the full credit value.
Even after the target is achieved, units serving low-income
housing and serving a community of customers continue to
get a credit value equal to the retail—not wholesale—value
of the power sold to customers by the utility. For these
transactions, the subsidy is the difference in value between

337. Id.
338. Avoided Cost, INDEP. ENERGY PRODUCERS ASS’N, http://www.iepa.com/avoid.
asp [https://perma.cc/5JK8-TW7H] (last visited June 2, 2016).
339. H. 3724, 189th Gen. Court. (Mass. 2015).
340. The author’s retail residential bill in the winter of 2015 was $0.25/kWh during
some of these months, the highest residential rate in the continental U.S. Net metering at
such a high rate would increase the compensation to the owners of the solar units while it
commensurately shifted the cost to all other consumers. Recall also, that Massachusetts
was the only one of the forty-four net metering states, which allowed the credits to be freely
transferred—sold—by the owner of the solar project to other customers of the utility.

284

FERREY (DO NOT DELETE)

10/17/2018 1:16 PM

Net Legal Power

[VOL. 53: 221, 2016]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW



what the utility could purchase wholesale electricity for and
what it then charges its retail customers for this power
commodity—the utility forfeits this upcharge and this loss
is paid by all other retail utility customers.
For those net metering who do not fit these categories, their
net metering credit is equal to the wholesale market transaction
price as established each month in the New England market.
There is no cross-subsidy, and the value to the net metering
customer is convenience, but not financial gain.341

In essence, the proposed legislation states that all customers should
cross-subsidize up to a target saturation, thereafter certain favored customers
should still get a lesser subsidy, while ordinary future net metering customers
should receive no subsidy. While this proposed legislation no longer
clings to the retail rate for all, it instead picks the commodity component
of the retail rate and the wholesale rate instead. There is no controversy
if a state elects to use the wholesale rate, as no state is required to net meter,
and if it does, many states have the utility pay for surplus net metered
power only at the wholesale power rate. However, the value of net metered
power to the utility system is the true metric.
D. The Legal Solution
The law can resolve legal friction, which is now present with net
metering and climate change initiatives in the U.S. States have a legal
resource and solid precedent that they did not appreciate was available to
justify reasoned and analytic net metering determinations, which few
states have made or exercised to date.342 States have both an obligation to
do so, and a legal defense if thereafter challenged. As the U.S. moves to
more sustainable renewable power, a series of well-established precedent
and law requires equitable and precise allocation of the costs of every
power transaction. Without undertaking this rate analysis and setting costs
and rates, there is a missing legal link.
What is established in applicable well-settled law343 is that state public
utility commissions must set fair and equitable rates for every non-wholesale
transaction of power within their states, at a value reflecting their best

341.
342.
343.

H. 3724, 189th Gen. Court. (Mass. 2015).
See supra Section IV.C.
See supra Section IV.
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determination of the value of the power transacted. FERC determined that
net metering is not a sale of wholesale power under certain factual
conditions.344 State commissions, without determination of value, are on
thin ice if they set the value of net metered transactions at the retail sale
rate without any calculation, because net metering is not a retail sale.
Commissions must make a finding of fact as to the costs and benefits
of net metering transactions and set net metering transaction values
accordingly. Such determinations based on legal precedent may result in
raising or lowering the net meter value compared to the approximate retail
rates that forty-two of forty-four states now afford net metering transactions.
Once commissions quantify and establish such values, states will be
on more solid legal ground moving forward. All forty-four net metering
programs in the states have existed for long enough for each state to have
done this.
To date, only Minnesota and Maine have made such a principled analytic
determination.345 This is where each net metering state should follow
Minnesota and Maine, and provide a legal foundation for its programs to
reflect actual benefits, costs, and ratemaking precedent. Stakeholder
demands for such a quantitative determination under state ratemaking
precedent will increase as net metering quickly becomes more pervasive
and total program impacts mount.
The physics of electricity in the United States will not align with the
law unless the states connect this missing link. Legal vulnerabilities call
for solutions: This is critical to meaningfully address climate change and
protect key U.S. climate policy. The path outlined in this Article has significant
immediate legal implications for policymakers. Timing matters when
dealing with the future of the planet. With the key 21st Paris Conference
of the Parties on the Kyoto Protocol on climate having concluded with new
urgency to restrain world carbon emissions, the time is now.

344.
345.

286

See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section V.C. & n.300.

